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The political theory of mixed government was venerated by most 
enlightened Anglo-American thinkers. After the English societal 
vicissitudes of the seventeenth century were quelled, many observers 
believed that this form of government—which combined the three tra­
ditional elements of political society: the monarch, the nobility, 
and the people, into a self-balancing unit—was the obvious choice 
for the ruling bodies of the New World colonies. 
Englishmen transported the theory to early America but only two of 
the three branches evolved in the colonies: the royal governor and 
the colonial assembly. Missing was the middle-spoke, the nobility, 
whose place was weakly assumed by the advisors to the governor, the 
royal council. Because councillors were subservient to the crown for 
their positions, but not titled noblemen, they were unsure of their 
legitimacy and lacked the necessary security and independence required 
of their positions. 
This lack of security and legitimacy led to significant political 
problems in America, none of which proved more debilitating than the 
marked instability of colonial politics. This instability, mildly 
present in the decades prior to the Revolution, became acute after 
1763, contributed to the growing tension, and led many Anglo-American 
officials into frenzied but unsuccessful attempts at creating artifi­
cial colonial nobilities to balance and stabilize the inchoate nature 
of early American government. 
The ultimate failure of an American nobility can be traced to its 
frigid reception by a republicans-spirited populace. Hitherto accepted 
ideas of distinctions, titles, and inequality based solely upon birth 
were antithetical to republicanism. Americans instead chose democratic 
political methods over time-honored and tradition-bound European ones 
in determining which men would rule their new, virtuous nation. 
Sources utilized in this study included the papers and correspon­
dence of various royal officials, as well as many pamphlets and 
newspapers spawned by the Revolutionary crisis. Much of the rich 
secondary literature recently published by the ideological scholars 
of the American Revolution was also incorporated. 
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The aristocracy are not the farmers who work the land, and raise the pro­
duce, but are the mere consumers of the rent; and when compared to the 
active world are the drones. . .who neither collect the honey nor form 
the hive, but exist only for lazy enjoyment. 
Thomas Paine 
The Rights of Man, 1791 
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- INTRODUCTION -
"Every Englishman loves a lord," is an old English saying, its 
origins unknown though popularized in seventeenth and eighteenth 
century England. In essence it means that Englishmen then and now are 
enamored by the idea of heraldry, peerage, titles of nobility and the 
like. The presence of a titled nobility has long been a hallmark of 
British society and suggests an easily identifiable social order, rigid 
social stratification, and at least a modicum of deference afforded 
those titled elites by the lower, less-privileged classes. Moreover, 
members of this aristocratic class in England have, over the course of 
history, legitimized their status by a variety of methods, but none 
more visible and important than the accumulation of power in the second 
branch of the government, the House of Lords. In recent times "the 
Lords" have steadily lost tangible power as has the monarch; both have 
given way to the dominance of the House of Commons, the representative 
body in the English system. During the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, however, the House of Lords reached its zenith of power and 
played an integral part in what many contemporary political theorists 
termed "the perfect constitution," the English-stylized phenomenon of 
mixed government. 
The constitutional theory was not new. Aristotle had first 
postulated it in the fourth century B.C. Yet it took some two thousand 
years to reach practical fruition. In feudal England after the Norman 
conquest great landed barons acted as advisors to the king and 
increased their power and political status; gradually over the course 
1 
2 
of the Middle Ages, this feudal aristocracy played an important role in 
the developing constitutional hierarchy. Partially as a dividend of 
the socio-political tumults of the seventeenth century each facet of 
the English political society: the monarch, the aristocracy, and the 
representatives of the land-owning gentry, members of the House of 
Commons, emerged into what many held as a perfectly balanced system of 
government. Each branch theoretically shared an equal amount of power 
and was thus able to check any excesses of the other two. Through this 
combination perpetual tranquility could be ensured in both government 
and society. 
The early English settlers transported this theory to the New 
World, though initially failing to put it into actual practice in their 
frontier societies. Many officials hoped these quasi-mixed governments 
in miniature would come with time to mirror the excellence of the 
mother country's constitution. As a beneficial result political strife 
would become nonexistent and harmonious governing would be ensured. 
The natural fruits of this harmony could only be increased mercantilist 
efficiency, and with that more profit could eventually flow from the 
colonies to England. 
As the colonial governments evolved, however, it became obvious 
that the mimesis of the British model had been only partially 
realized. By the early eighteenth century the House of Commons was 
clearly symbolized in the form of the colonial assembly the institution 
that embodied the locally elected representatives of the people. The 
monarch too, in the person of the king's vicegerent, the appointed 
royal governor, ruled in an executive capacity in most colonies. But 
3 
the nobility, represented in the House of Lords in England was acutely 
absent in colonial America. 
Attempts were made throughout colonial history to remedy this 
defect. The colonial council, established during the seventeenth 
century settlements, consisted of a group of the wealthiest men in the 
various societies, usually twelve in number, who were chosen by the 
governor or appointed in Britain to fulfill the constitutional role of 
an American House of Lords. But as Michael Kammen, an eminent historian 
of the period has written, "No one really knew how to define the proper 
role and identity of the colonial council. It was not quite a cabinet, 
but not quite a counterpart of the House of Lords either."''' To further 
complicate its ambiguous position, it had no colony-wide uniform 
instructions or traditions to follow. Moreover, councillors in America 
in contrast to their English counterparts held no special privileges, 
no titles, no hereditary honors, nor any other attributes to 
distinguish them from other colonial Americans. This was of 
significance because to paraphrase the venerable historian R.R. Palmer, 
"For to be an aristocrat it is not enough to think of oneself as such, 
it is necessary to be thought so by others." As a result of this lack 
of legitimacy and this confused identity, the members of the various 
councils by the eve of the Revolutionary crisis had become either 
"creatures of the People," as one royal governor complained or 
flatterers and pawns at the disposal of politically pressured 
3 
governors. "Yet," as another colonial scholar, Bernard Bailyn, has 
noted, "these were the bodies expected to maintain, by their 
independence from pressures generated above and below, the balance of 
4 
the whole. The fact that they could not do so was considered a major 
4 
failing of colonial government." 
This lack of security, legitimacy, and identity led to several 
significant political problems in the developing colonies, none of 
which proved more important or debilitating than a marked instability 
in the realm of colonial and provincial politics. This instability, 
mildly present in the decades prior to the Revolution, became 
especially acute after 1763, contributed heavily to the growing 
revolutionary tension and led many royal officials both in America and 
Great Britain into frenzied but unsuccessful attempts at creating 
artificial nobilities in the colonies in hopes of balancing and 
stabilizing the inchoate nature of early American government. 
Their lack of success is perplexing. Eighteenth century America 
was in the process of becoming more like the mother country, undergoing 
what historians have recently termed the Anglicization of their 
respective societies.^ This metamorphosis took various forms ranging 
from colonial mimicking of religious habits and practices, to the 
imitation of eighteenth century English Whig opposition political 
culture. Why, then, did a nobility in pre-Revolutionary America fail 
to take hold, particularly in light of the above, and what were the 
ultimate ramifications of its absence? Answers to these questions are 
complex, but analysis can provide clues to the chaotic American 
political situation as it existed on the eve of the Revolution. By 
examining the stillbirth of the titled nobility in America we can 
better understand our colonial relationship with Great Britain. More 
importantly, we can begin to tie further loose strands together in our 
5 
continuing quest at comprehending just how revolutionary our actions 
some two centuries ago really were. 
6 
-NOTES, INTRODUCTION -
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- CHAPTER ONE -
THE VENERATED CONSTITUTION 
"The best model of Government that can be framed by Mortals " was 
the description one American used in 1759 to explain the brilliance of 
1 
the English constitution of government. Most Americans considered this 
no overstatement. For well over a century they had been lectured from 
pulpit to political stump on the peculiar excellence of the mother 
country's form of mixed government, so much so that by the middle of 
the eighteenth century the reverence of the political theory had become 
2 
as firmly entrenched in the colonies as it had in England. 
Why the glorification, the near deification of this particular 
political system—a system that prompted near-universal acclamation by 
3 the eve of the American Revolution? The answer can be found through an 
exploration of the origin and evolution of the classical English 
constitution, particularly the middle branch, and how exactly the 
theory was thought to work when practiced in England. 
I 
Aristotle first gave expression to the notion of a balanced mixed 
government in the fourth century B.C. The Greek historian, Polybius, 
4 
expanded upon it some two centuries later. The theory is simple to 




In a pure state, three basic forms of government exist: the 
monarch, the rule of one person, usually divinely appointed to lead; 
an aristocracy, the rule of an elite cadre, typically the 
property-owning few; or a democracy, rule of the people or at least 
many or more than a few. Unfortunately, as historical examples had 
demonstrated to Aristotle and then Polybius, the monarch left unchecked 
or unbridled would soon degenerate into tyranny; the aristocracy 
unguarded became an oppressive oligarchy; and the people left 
unattended, would fall into a chaotic, anarchistic, licentious mob. 
The remedy theorists from Aristotle forward argued, was to combine each 
of these elements into a single self-balancing, self-checking system, 
providing each with roughly equal powers and privileges, thus ensuring 
that each separate branch would mutually reinforce the other or check 
the other two against each's tendency to usurp power. Perpetual peace, 
social harmony and political stability, most held, resulted from this 
union. A government and a people fortunate enough to reach this stage, 
would realize near political nirvana. 
II 
The theory of mixed government remained just a theory throughout 
later antiquity and into the Middle Ages, never placed into actual 
practice in any realm. Nevertheless, European writers and political 
thinkers including Erasmus, Machiavelli, and John Calvin venerated the 
5 
notion during the course of the Renaissance and Reformation. But it 
9 
was left to the English Tudors who, after the feudal evolution of their 
unique brand of limited monarchy had reached its apex with the reign of 
6 
Henry VIII, to proclaim theirs a "mixt state." 
Numerous writers extolled the virtues of the English system 
throughout the Tudor-Stuart era, yet it was left to King Charles I 
during the early seventeenth century to provide a measure of legitimacy 
to the idea with his Answer to the XIX Propositions of Both Houses of 
Parliament. This key political document was supposedly written by 
himself and his ministers, in answer to constitutional conundrums 
raised by the Long Parliament in the early days of the English Civil 
War in 1642. The propositions outlined the various vices of unchecked 
power and listed the virtues of mixed government, especially "the 
Lords. . .[who] are an excellent Screen and Bank between Prince and 
People. . .assist[ing] each [of the other branches] against any 
encroachments of the other." ̂  Indeed, after the Restoration of the 
House of Lords in 1661, both Tories and Whigs united in their belief 
that the role of the peerage was vital to the success of mixed 
g 
government. The Lords represented the propertied, landed element in 
British society and existed to protect their class's interests. Even 
Whig and opposition writers as diverse as John Locke, the Earl of 
Shaftesbury, James Harrington, Robert Molesworth, and Lord Bolingbroke, 
"saw hereditary status," as one English historian has observed, "as a 
reinforcement of propertied independence and a guard against the 
9 
machinations of the Court." 
The nobility's attainment of this vaunted position had not been a 
recent occurrence; rather, it had gradually evolved over the course of 
10 
centuries. The origins of the English aristocracy lay deep in the 
feudal past, its roots traceable to pre-Norman, Frankish society. 
After the Norman conquest, feudalism emerged as the dominant 
socio-political system in England. Great landed barons and high-ranking 
bishops, both of which wielded much political sway, became advisors to 
10 
the king and participated in the ruling of the realm. By virtue of 
their exhalted positions, hereditary honors and titles, a 
Frankish-Germanic holdover, were passed from generation to generation, 
legitimizing and firmly establishing their hierarchial position in the 
feudal order. Throughout the Middle Ages these nobles came to be 
viewed as an integral part of government; because of their vast 
land-holdings they held a vital stake in the political fortunes of the 
i • 11 kxngdom. 
Their powerful status, great wealth, and heredity, moreover, 
provided these aristocrats with independence—an independence that 
allowed them to remain nearly incorruptable and stalwart, even in the 
face of the most tyrannical monarchs. By the seventeenth and well into 
the eighteenth century, members of the House of Lords, because of their 
talents, positions, and responsiblities as the supreme judicial 
arbiters of the land and the advisory body to the monarch, were 
considered the equipoise of the three branches of English government, 
the middle spoke of the wheel, the balance weight of the 
1 2 
constitution. Without their mediating influence, their independence, 
and their wise council, as England painfully learned during the chaotic 
Interregnum when the House of Lords had been dissolved, the beloved 
constitution could easily collapse into either a tyranny of one, or 
11 
worse, England might experience the dreaded: the anarchistic, 
republican aspirations of the people. A strong, independent, 
hereditary peerage, then, seemed necessary to the harmony of 
government. 
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries political 
theorists echoed and reinforced these sentiments via their numerous 
writings. James Harrington in Oceana, published in 1656, included, an 
13 
aristocracy in his Utopian scheme, housed in a senate. John Locke, as 
well, in his monumental political tracts published in the 1670s and 
80s, felt that the aristocracy was of paramount importance in any 
political society. But it was left to the great French philosophe, C. 
Secondat Montesquieu, to bring world-wide attention to the virtues and 
14 
moderating role of the nobility in mixed government. Published in 
1748 and widely read throughout the Empire, The Spirit of the Laws 
praised the English constitution, as the Frenchman hailed it, "this 
beautiful system." To Montesquieu, the nobles embodied in the House of 
Lords provided the vital stability and regulation necessary to the 
concept of mixed government. He observed that, "the three powers. . . 
have a need of a regulating power to temper them [and] the part of the 
legislative body composed of the nobility is extremely proper for this 
purpose." The nobility, the French philosopher held, "ought to be 
15 
hereditary." 
Colonial Americans avidly read and were influenced by English 
history, Whig political theory, Harrington, Montesquieu, Blackstone, 
and other contemporary English thinkers and European writers."^ They 
too, of course, held a variety of perceptions regarding their unique 
12 
brand of government. The seventeenth century development and evolution 
of their colonial governments with a focus on the development of the 
all-important middle branch provides clues to American society, 
politics, and government as it stood a century later—a century marked 
by political tumult, societal upheaval, and revolution with Great 
Britain. 
13 
- NOTES, CHAPTER ONE -
1. Quoted in Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 
1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, 1969), p. 11. 
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A Vindication of the Government of New England Churches (Boston, 
1717) and Jared Eliot, Give Cesare His Due (New London, 1738) for 
just two of dozens; from the secular angle the political writings 
of the era are inundated with examples; see William Douglass, A_ 
Summary, Historical and Political....of the British Settlements 
in North-America (Boston, 1747); James Wilson, Considerations on 
the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British 
Parliament (Philadelphia, 1774); and James Otis, Rights of the 
British Colonies Asserted and Proved (Boston, 1764) for just a 
few of the less obscure. 
3. See Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, pp. 10-17. 
4. Much of what follows in this chapter is drawn from Corinne C. 
Weston, English Constitutional Theory and the House of Lords, 
1556-1832 (New York, 1965), especially, Chaps. 1 and 2. 
5. See Erasmus, Education of a Christian Prince, (1516); 
Machiavelli's Discourses (1522); and Calvin's Institutes of 
Christian Religion (1536). 
6. John Ponet, A Short Treatise of Politike Power (London, 1556). 
7. King Charles I, His Majesties Answer to the XIX Propositions of 
Both Houses of Parliament (London, 1642). 
8. The political rhetoric and sources are vast in supplementing this 
notion. For seventeenth century English political debate on the 
role of the House of Lords and the British polity, see The 
Reasons and Narrative of Proceedings Betwixt the Two Houses 
(London, 1679). 
9. J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political 
Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975), 
pp. 513-14. 
10. Allen R. Brown, Origins of English Feudalism (London, 1973), pp. 
24-25. 
11. For an extensive discussion of the feudal background of the 
English constitution, see J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution 
and the Feudal Law (London, 1957). 
14 
12. Weston, Constitutional Theory, p. 3. 
13. Harrington was widely read in the colonies and some of his ideas 
were used in formulating the constitutions of Pennsylvania, the 
Jerseys, and Carolina, see H. F. Russel Smith, Harrington and His 
Oceana (Cambridge, 1914). 
14. Weston, Constitutional Theory, p. 126. 
15. C. Secondat Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Franz 
Neumann, ed., trans. Thomas Nugent, (New York, 1949), Bk. XI, 
Sec. 6, pp. 161-62. 
16. Ellen Brennan in Plural Office-Holding in Massachusetts, 
1760-1780 (Chapel Hill, 1945) has traced the influence of 
Montesquieu in eighteenth century America. Trevor Colburn's The 
Lamp of Experience (New York, 1965) details the many and varied 
political histories which Americans read, and Louis B. Wright has 
examined colonial libraries, discovering that many Americans were 
quite well-read in classical as well as English political theory 
and history, The First Gentlemen of Virginia; Intellectual 
Qualities of the Early Colonial Ruling Class (San Marino, Ca., 
1940), see below, Chapter Two. 
- CHAPTER TWO -
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY STILLBIRTH 
"Governments, like clocks, go from the motion men give 
them." 
William Penn, 1681 
Titles of nobility, degrees of rank, preoccupation with hereditary 
background, pedigree and the like are of small, if not insignificant, 
consequence in mostly middle-class modern America. We dismiss such 
displays as the procuring of coats-of-arms, and Daughters of the 
American Revolution genealogical forays as mere trifles practiced by 
quaint elders. In seventeenth century America, however, Englishmen 
were not so quick to reach negative conclusions. On the contrary, 
titles, degrees, ranks and noblemen capitivated the imagination of 
those initial English settlers and colonizers even though the formal 
political and social structure of their respective societies was crude 
at best. The idea of noblemen symbolized institutions from the country 
1 
they had recently departed. During the ages of Shakespeare and Sir 
Walter Raleigh, Elizabethan social philosophers taught and preached 
that the decided feudal holdover of rigid class differentiation, 
deference, social hierarchy, and artificial degrees were all part of 
the accepted nature of the world and ordained by God. Only the best of 
the better sort, it was unquestioningly held, were fit to rule, and 
titles of distinction marked them as members of this favored or chosen 
15 
16 
group. In the 1614 edition of his History of the World, Raleigh summed 
up this accepted philosophy when he wrote that in his infinite wisdom, 
"God. . .hath distinguished his angels by degrees. . .[and] hath also 
2 
ordained kings, dukes, and other degrees among men." Englishmen, 
quite understandably, brought this set of ideas to America, and from 
the members of the lower gentry who settled in the southern environs to 
the Puritans of New England, titles and honors were a mark of respect 
and status though no bona fide English peers actually settled in the 
3 
New World to legitimately perpetuate them. 
Contributing to this infatuation with honors and distinction was 
the rise of the gentry class in late Elizabethan England. By the early 
part of the seventeenth century, due in part to the dramatic 
demographic increase of the aristocracy and gentry classes and the need 
for revenue in the coffers of King James I, a new set of honorific 
4 titles to be sold at a handsome price were created. The combined 
demographic and economic pressures and the relative ease of social 
mobility in the lower gentry classes allowed more and more Englishmen 
to yearn for these distinctions. Hence, a spate of baronets, knights, 
esquires, and gentlemen emerged and flourished throughout late Stuart 
5 
England. 
However, these newcomers were denied certain legal privileges, 
such as seats in the House of Lords—the ultimate honorific 
distinction—and faced, to be sure, a wide social gulf between 
themselves and the traditional peerage. A disgruntled Elizabethan, 
Thomas Smith, described in oversimplified but prescient terms the 
plight of the gentry and the concomitant rationalization for 
17 
colonization when he lamented that "such younger brothers as were wont 
to be thrust into abbeys there to lead an idle life, since that is now 
6 
taken from them, must now seek some other place to live in." 
These frustrated gentry and their immediate descendants, along 
with the adventuresome and the down and out indentured servants, were 
some of the first to relocate to Virginia and later other portions of 
southern America. How did not only they, but other settlers in the 
mid-Atlantic and New England regions order and structure their 
political societies, particularly the all-important middle branches, in 
light of the prevailing view of hereditary authority but in the face of 
an uncivilized frontier? 
I 
The Virginia government, as did most of the colonial governments, 
operated under a charter granted by the sovereign, that stipulated a 
ruling council along with an appointed royal governor. Though their 
functions and duties varied from colony to colony, the councils were to 
advise the governor on any matter of importance, assume the executive 
administration of the colony in his absence, and sit as the upper 
houses of their respective domains with the power to initiate, veto, 
and vote on legislation. Further, the councils had some degree of 
judicial power and in many colonies served as the "General Court" or 
7 
supreme judicial body. The chosen councillors usually consisted of 
elites selected from the higher echelons of either the English 
8 
aristocracy or from those noblemen already in the colonies. Yet few 
18 
members of the upper nobility actually emigrated to America, content 
instead to remain home and reap profits from investments in the joint 
stock companies that operated in the colonial wilderness. If a large 
number had emigrated and remained, the formation of a legitimate 
American nobility could have had a good base from which to begin. But 
those who did make the hazardous trek usually returned after a very 
9 
short stay. 
These first council members consisted mostly of those social 
upstarts in England who had come to America in hopes of making a quick 
profit and returning. Yet despite their middling status in England, 
these new elites quickly ascended to the top of the frontier society 
and assumed political, social, and economic leadership of the colony. 
The majority of the population initially acquiesed and modestly 
deferred to this first wave of English gentry. As the historian 
Bernard Bailyn has noted, "Nothing could have been more alien to the 
[early colonial] settlers than the idea that competition for political 
10 
leadership should be open to all levels of society." And despite the 
fact that "Virginia's big men were a good bit smaller than England's," 
as Virginia historian Edmund S. Morgan has observed, their prestige and 
authority in the distant lands after initial problems of settlement 
organization were solved, nearly mirrored that of the English 
11 
nobility. 
By the 1640s, the original group of English elites had succumbed 
to disease, and repeated Indian attacks, or had simply given up and 
gone back to England. It was supplanted by an indigenous, tougher, 
coarser, native elite which had made its fortunes off of tobacco. 
19 
These new aristocrats, if they can be characterized as such, solidified 
their positions through intermarriage and near permanent tenure on the 
colonial council. It is this stage, Bailyn argues, "that marks the 
emergence of Virginia's colonial aristocracy"—a native elite that 
remained at the top of Virginia's and later America's political, 
12 
economic, and social ladder for almost the next two centuries. 
After 1640 a seat on the colonial council in Virginia, generally 
carried with it a life-tenure and a small clique of elites solidified 
13 
its position therein. Political leadership was considered the mark of 
a true English gentleman, gave the appearance the politician was a man 
of intellect, a natural leader. Moreover, and surely enticing, one 
14 
could write "esquire" after one's name if he served on the Council. 
This was an enormous incentive to these new elites, because no legal or 
social distinctions existed in early Virginia only the measure of 
wealth, a characteristic that has hitherto historically remained a mark 
of an American aristocrat, and distinguished them from the thousands of 
other immigrants of lowly stature who poured into the colony after 
mid-century. Why, then, did not these frontier aristocrats institute 
measures to solidify their position and newly-acquired status by 
ennobling themselves, not only ensuring their own independency and 
position in the colony, but their descendants as well? To do so would 
have legitimized their status in the New World, and recreated, at least 
in part, a familiar institution in a hostile environment. 
There is no doubt that this new Virginia aristocracy desired to be 
like its English cousins. Pedigrees could be obtained for a fee, and 
many were; coats-of-arms were yearned after, and the titles of 
20 
"gentleman" and "esquire" were reserved only for a man of great social 
and political distinction, such as those aforementioned council 
members. 
Some of the Virginia aristocrats' library holdings illustrate just 
how captivating the idea of heraldry, pedigree, and titles could be to 
seventeenth century Virginians. York county merchant Matthew Hubbard's 
collections contained a copy of the English gentleman John Selden's 
Titles of Honors, published in 1614. The planter Godfrey Pole's 
holdings included among others, a peerage compiled by Ralph Brooke, A_ 
Catalogue and Succession of the Kings, Princes, and Dukes, of 1622. 
Ralph Worinley II also read Selden's Titles of Honor, as well as his The 
Privileges of the Baronage of England, (1642), and Virginia statesman 
Richard Lee II, thought invaluable James York's, The Union of Honor, 
1640, Selden's Titles of Honor, and Richard Braithwaite's The English 
Gentleman, ( 1 6 3 0 ) .  
Though wealth and large land-holdings were the overriding marks of 
distinction between the better sort and the rest of Virginia society, 
membership in the colonial council gave the new elite the best 
opportunity to institutionalize its recently achieved status. By the 
late seventeenth century, the new councillor families viewed council 
seats almost exclusively as their own (but not quite), by hereditary 
right. Names such as Lee, Byrd, and Carter, appear on the rolls 
continuously throughout the late seventeenth and well into the 
eighteenth century. Yet traditional English honors were not 
forthcoming and solidification of their status was not undertaken. Why 
not? 
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Professor Bailyn suggests that by the end of the seventeenth 
century the council had lost most of its initial power through 
political alignments with the representative body, the House of 
Burgesses. "Increasingly," he writes, "the Council's distinctions 
became social and ceremonial." Power that heretofore had rested with 
the council members became diffused amongst the house and the office of 
the governor—now manned by a tougher breed sent over in the wake of 
16 
the tumultuous Virginia social upheaval, Bacon's Rebellion of 1676. 
The introduction of black slavery into the colony, moveover, freed more 
white Englishmen from the bonds of indentured servitude. Gradually 
over the course of the next century, these white freeholders acquired 
small farms and found political expression in the Assembly. Their 
political status and power in that body grew commensurately with their 
17 
numbers. 
In addition, and of significance, the king was the only person in 
the Empire who could create new peers of the realm. Highly jealous of 
its long-manicured status, the nobility who advised the English 
sovereign, viewed the colonial Virginia elites as mere social 
upstarts. These Virginians they held, were parvenues. To suggest that 
their new and recently acquired wealth and resulting political power 
afforded these middling gentry equal stature with the English peers was 
18 
at the very least, offensive. In the eyes of the British nobility, 
the colonials' social status, regardless of their new found and in some 
cases immense wealth, remained unchanged from the date of their 
departure from England; they were still considered members of the lower 
19 
and middle gentry. 
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Robert Quarry, a sort of colonial spy employed by the Lord's 
Commissioners of Trade and Plantations had been dispatched to the 
colonies at the turn of the century to report on the conditions he 
witnessed. In 1703 he warned the Lords that, "The Council [in 
Virginia] have vanity enough to think, that they almost stand upon 
equal terms with the Right Honorable House of Lords. These false and 
pernicious notions, if not timely prevented will have a very ill 
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consequence." What those consequences might have been Quarry did not 
elaborate, but in New York, the perceptive Governor Hunter, himself 
facing an upstart council, warned the ministry in 1711 that if the New 
York Council successfully claimed the "rights and privileges of a House 
of Peers," they could very easily become, "a body politic coordinate 
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with and consequently independent of the Great Council of the Realm." 
The point was obviously well-observed in England; no titled 
hereditary nobility evolved in Virginia, or any other colony, for that 
matter, during the seventeenth century, in large measure due to the 
political evolution and solidification of the Council's opposing 
check—the Assembly. In Virginia, though the elites may have pined for 
titles, they really did not require them to maintain their political 
status, as it came to be almost automatic with their accumulation of 
wealth. More importantly, their selfish English counterparts had no 
compelling desire to share their long-nurtured prestige with the new 
Virginia elites. What, then, of others in the developing South? 
II 
If any seventeenth century colony could have fostered a colonial 
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nobility, South Carolina may initially have had the best chance. The 
Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, the basic document upon which 
Carolina was founded, and perhaps the most unique document in colonial 
American history, provided for a local nobility to rule the colony. 
Early attempts at settling the Carolina region proved 
unsuccessful. In 1629, King Charles I granted his attorney general, 
Sir Robert Heath, most of the area south of Virginia. The Heath charter 
eventually lapsed however, due to a lack of interest and activity in 
the region. This early charter is important in two aspects. First, it 
did make a provision for a provincial "Carolina nobility" of sorts 
which would assume the reigns of leadership. Heath would have full and 
nearly unfettered power to make laws, appoint some ministers, and 
"confer favours, graces. . .honors. . .titles. . .and dignities. . . 
upon well-deserving citizens," though he never undertook such 
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activity. Second, and more important, this 1629 charter stood as a 
model for later frames of government, including the 1663 charter, the 
immediate predecessor to the famous Fundamental Constitutions of 
Carolina promulgated in 1669. 
During the Restoration, Charles II renewed an interest in the 
Carolina project and granted title of the lands to eight of his loyal 
courtiers. Included among these was Anthony Ashley Cooper, who later 
2 '  
became the powerful parliamentary spokesman, the Earl of Shaftsbury. 
The 1663 charter contained certain feudal aspects to it, hitherto 
unique to colonial grants (save for the 1629 Heath charter), including 
a built-in social stratifier, a local nobility. When quick riches 
failed to materialize, however, most of the English proprietors lost 
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interest—most that is except Lord Ashley. Ashley with the aid of his 
secretary, personal physician, and confidant John Locke, set out to 
reorganize the fledgling society based on then fashionable 
Harringtonian principles of government. Harrington believed, as most 
of his day did, that a strong independent upper class was vital to the 
welfare of any society. Ashley and Locke agreed and deliberately 
sought to put several of the English philosopher's governmental 
principles, articulated in his famous Utopian tract, Oceana, into 
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actual practice. The product of their imagination bore fruit in 1669 
in the form of the Fundamental Constitutions. 
The Constitutions, a most remarkable and unique colonial document, 
was an attempt by Ashley and Locke to institute a manorial social and 
political system in Carolina. The Constitutions of 1669 and their 
subsequent variations allowed for an elaborate, exceedingly complex 
hierarchical system of nobility to rule the colony. At the top of the 
ladder rested the eight proprietors, whom Ashley hoped he could 
convince to emigrate to Carolina and oversee the colony first-hand. 
Beneath the proprietors in status were two ranks of nobles, 
"landgraves" and "caciques." Their power and status as was most often 
the case in the seventeenth century South, was based exclusively on 
ownership of land. These landgraves and caciques were to play a key 
role in the governing of the colony, acting as magistrates and holding 
seats in a "Council of Nobles." Titles of nobility would be conferred 
upon them by the proprietors and henceforth this newly created social 
class, by virtue of the authority granted them and the legitimacy 
gained by the Constitutions, would serve as the hereditary nobility of 
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Carolina. In keeping with English tradition, these nobles could not be 
removed from their positions except by the proprietors, and they 
obtained numerous privileges others lower in the hierarchy did not, 
such as the right to trial composed only of proprietors and 
25 
life-tenure. 
Yet Ashley and Locke did not fashion themselves as starry-eyed 
Utopians and did not foresee the immediate implementation of such rigid 
and traditional social hierarchy on a crude, essentially lawless 
frontier society. Ashley only believed the Constitutions served as 
"the compasse [we] are to steere by," and anticipated that only after 
the passage of Carolina into a more stable stage could the provisions 
of the "Grand Model" as he often called it, be put into formal 
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practice. As a result, the implementation of the Constitutions 
remained in a flux over the course of the next twenty-five-odd years 
while Carolina politics grew chaotic and government authority tenuous. 
As one of the foremost South Carolina colonial historians has written: 
"For all the idealism of Shaftesbury and Locke, the proprietors had 
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failed to create a colony that was. j .stable." 
As the governmental structure of the Carolina region came 
gradually to mirror those of other seventeenth century colonies, Locke 
and Ashley's dreams of an upper body of nobility lingered. In their 
correspondence and instructions to royal officials in Carolina, the 
Lords Proprietors often referred to the upper house as "the 
„ 28 
nobility. Even members of the lower house, always jealous of their 
29 
status, referred to the Council as a nobility in a 1698 debate. Later 




Of those colonies formed in the mid-Atlantic area, the Catholic 
proprietary haven of Maryland offered the best opportunity for the 
practical establishment of a local, landed hereditary aristocracy. As 
had been the case with Virginia to the south, members of the lower 
gentry class migrated to Maryland from England. A squirearchy of sorts, 
based entirely on property-holding, developed and was given a form of 
feudal legitimacy based on the early charter granted to the patron and 
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first proprietor of Maryland, Lord Baltimore. The charter allowed him 
the privilege "to conferre favours, rewards, and honors, upon such 
inhabitants within the Province. . .as shall deserve the same; and to 
invest them, with what titles and dignities soever as he shall thinke 
fit." However, in this last regard, Baltimore was warned that the 
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titles could not "be. . .such as are now used in England.' This last 
tacked on caveat as one historian has observed, rendered these 
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provisions, "a mere nullity." 
Due in large measure to the chaotic nature of early Chesapeake 
social development, few individuals within early Maryland could meet 
the three required traits England had set forth as basic criteria to 
serve on the Council. According to royal instructions, council members 
had to be "men of good life and well affected to [the king's] 
government and of good estates and abilities and not necessitous 
„ 35 
persons or much in debt. Thus in Maryland, as well as other 
seventeenth century settlements, finding enough members to meet the 
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requirements and form a respectable council proved a difficult task. 
Not until the early eighteenth century was a stable council formed from 
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the most wealthy of society materialize in Maryland. 
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The colony suffered extensively from a high turnover rate of 
councillors in its formative period. Death, departure, and removal 
from their positions for disloyalty, not an uncommon malady in Catholic 
Maryland, each took their toll and contributed perceptibly to the 
instability and ineffectiveness of the Calvert family government. In 
addition, by mid-century, most of the councillors appointed by the 
proprietary family were Catholic, but were drawn from an increasingly 
Protestant constituency. Naturally, much resentment resulted and the 
governor's advisors received little of the respect their elitist 
counterparts in other colonies had come to take for granted. A 
nobility, or a noble class cannot, of course, exist if it does not have 
the respect and admiration of the great majority of the population. 
The landed class in Maryland, especially those who sat on the Council 
did not engender such feelings from the general population. 
A concerned Lord Baltimore correctly gauged the decline in respect 
of the people and witnessed for himself the ineffectiveness of the 
Council. In 1637 he attempted to press the Assembly to establish some 
form of hereditary aristocracy. The Representatives would have no 
part of it, and this attempt withered nearly as immediately as 
Baltimore's endeavors to elevate the status of his council in 1666 by 
forcing them to "wear habits, medles or otherwise," in order that "some 
distinction or distinctions might be drawn" between the Council members 
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and the general population. The proprietor failed to understand that 
only over the course of time and through the accumulation of vast 
estates and political power could the infant Maryland aristocracy 
increase its position in the eyes of the populace. Indeed, during the 
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latter stages of the seventeenth century, particularly after the tough, 
prerogative-minded royal governor Francis Nicholson arrived in 1694, 
certain members of the Council, through a series of intermarriages and 
accumulation of money and land, finally began to solidify their hold 
and reputation on the office and reach the same type of status as their 
counterparts in other colonies. 
Yet a high price had been exacted for this new found stability, 
The Maryland Council throughout the eighteenth century consisted of a 
majority of strong crown supporters, men who would support royal policy 
no matter how unpopular even when facing, as they did later in the 
century, a powerful and vocal assembly made up of local interests. To 
gain much of its stability, the governor's advisors had had to barter 
away much of its original power contained in the charter with the 
Assembly. A seepage of real political power into the lower house had 
resulted in the years after 1689 and the Council, despite gaining 
political stability and some degree of respectability, sat as 
figureheads in eighteenth century Maryland, its independence curtailed 
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by strong gubernatorial and prerogative ties. The independence 
guaranteed by a titled status, the tangible political power and 
influence that followed, were lost by the Maryland Council because of 
the realities of provincial politics and a one sentence clause in the 
original charter; the by-product that resulted: a nobility that could 
have developed and made its presence felt, never reared its head. 
The constitutional structure of the mid-Atlantic province of 
Pennsylvania made no provision for a nobility embodied in the upper 
house of the government. Nevertheless, the social structure of the 
Quaker stronghold was, for a time, ripe for the evolution of one. 
The driving force behind the settlement of the colony was William 
Penn, described by a recent Pennsylvania historian as "essentially a 
conservative thinker, committed to a political order based on 
property." ̂  Penn envisioned a political system which upheld "all 
reasonable distinction and. . .civil degrees that are amongst people," 
and on at least one occasion longed for a Pennsylvania such as "of old 
time [when] the Nobility and Gentry spent their estates in the country 
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and kept the people in it. 
Penn's early drafts of the Pennsylvania constitution, which he 
entitled: "Frames of Government," reflect his conservative thinking. 
In his initial draft of early 1682, the Quaker proprietor created a 
system where the governor would be assisted by a two-chamber 
parliament. The upper chamber, similar to the House of Lords, would 
contain the large landholders of the province (5,000 acres or more). 
These "lords" as Penn styled them, would hold their seats for life with 
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their positions devolving to their male heirs. 
In later drafts, Penn changed his mind with regard to his miniture 
House of Lords. Thomas Rudyard, a close advisor, persuaded Penn to 
rethink his constitution, because so few men of sufficient wealth had 
migrated to Pennsylvania and the many vacancies in his seventy-two man 
upper house. Moreover, Rudyard argued that such an aristocratic flavor 
would "reflect on us as a people who affect Granduire beyond our 
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pretensions, and sett up that in state polity which our religious 
Capacity we have struck against beyond any people whatsoever." The 
aristocratic scheme had best be scrapped, Rudyard urged. Penn agreed 
and in subsequent frames stripped the Council of its hereditary and 
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titled trappings and some of its legislative power as well. 
In spite of the Quaker proprietor's and later his successor's 
attempts at creating a strong, aristocratic council balanced against a 
representative assembly, the Council during Pennsylvania's first twenty 
years—the last twenty of the seventeenth century—developed into a 
quandary of chaos and instability. Much like Maryland to the south, 
the Pennsylvania Council experienced a drastic turnover rate in 
membership. Eighty-seven men served on the eighteen-man C ouncil 
between 1681-1701, greatly affecting the continuity, stability, and 
44 
reputation of the initially powerful middle branch. Penn, although 
tempering its power from the first draft of his constitution, still 
succeeded in draping his advisors with relatively strong power—power 
their counterparts in other colonies had not yet achieved, or had 
realized early on but had bargained away. ̂  
Unfortunately for the gentlemen who composed the Council, much 
like its Maryland counterpart, it had to compromise much of its 
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chartered power to the Assembly. ' A body that had originally owed its 
position to election from a small group of landholders, had been 
reformed by those in England wishing to stabilize the faltering 
system. By the turn of the century, membership on the Council had 
become an appointive position. Allegiance was owed not to Pennsylvania 
freeholders but to the proprietor and ultimately the crown. By 1701 
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Pennsylvania's council had fallen from its original lofty 
constitutional position; it spent much of the eighteenth century 
unsuccessfully attempting to regain its lost stature. Mimesis of a 
nobility in the Quaker provinces of Pennsylvania and later an offshoot, 
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Delaware, had fallen by the wayside. 
V 
Precarious is too mild a description of the early political 
history of the two Jerseys, West and East. The rampant political 
instability, combined with an inconsistent land policy, and a polygot 
population of French, Dutch, Germans, Scots, and Quaker Englishmen, 
afforded little chance for a landed, titled nobility. 
After several early Dutch forays into the area, Charles I granted 
the vaguely defined region of what is mainly now present-day New Jersey 
to a court favorite, Sir Edmund Plowden and his associates. Little is 
known of Plowden; he made no attempt to colonize, but after his one and 
only visit to America he began to style himself: "Earl Palatine," and 
had visions of turning his proprietary into a feudal fiefdom replete 
with "noble knights." ̂  
Plowden's plans never materialized and it was left to a new group 
of proprietors in the 1660s to undertake the task of colonizing and 
framing a government. In East Jersey the proprietors' chief goals were 
economic, and to ensure simple and efficient government, oddly enough, 
they modeled their constitution on the complex Fundamental 
Constitutions of Carolina, calling them the "Concessions and 
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Agreements." The document, promulgated in 1665, was a facsimile of the 
Lockean prototype but divested of its cumbersome built-in nobility 
provisions. As of then, no members of the gentry had bothered to 
emigrate; only a few small farms dotted the region. The Concessions 
and Agreements remained intact until 1702 when the two regions were 
combined and became a royal colony. Between their drafting in 1665 and 
the turn of the century, the Concessions went through numerous reforms, 
none of which included a provision for the elevation of the status of 
the elite. 
Meanwhile, tumult rocked the prevailing governments due in large 
part to the lack of any appreciable upper class in the polity and 
because of an incoherent land distribution system on the part of the 
numerous revolving proprietors. Moreover, the population, like 
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Carolina's and Maryland's, was diverse and faction-ridden. Thus, 
prevalent conditions in East Jersey did not lend themselves to the 
creation of even a localized aristocracy, let alone a province-wide, 
formal nobility. 
Much the same occurred in West Jersey, which by the 1670s had 
become a Quaker stronghold controlled largely by the Penn proprietary. 
To attract settlers to that region a liberal constitution, the 
"Concessions and Agreements of 1677," was framed, creating a large, 
powerful assembly and a small, relatively impotent appointive 
council.It, too, was revised several times prior to the turn of the 
century, with no provision of a nobility ever included. West Jersey 
experienced similar problems vis-a-vis land as did East Jersey, only it 
was much easier to acquire in the western colony. Small farms 
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characterized the area and the great landed plantations that marked the 
south never developed. By 1702 the crown and the proprietors had tired 
of the turmoil and agreed that the Jerseys be combined and transformed 
into a royal colony with the characteristic appointive upper house. 
The proprietors suggested to Queen Anne that she use care in her 
appointment of the initial councillors, because if no qualifying 
restrictions were placed on the appointments "those Persons of best 
Estate in ye Countrie and ye Proprietors Interests would be at ye 
disposall of ye tag, rag, and Rascallity," that made up the 
preponderence of the New Jersey population. ̂  
VI 
The Dutch originally settled a portion of the Hudson Valley in the 
1620s and 1630s, but were usurped by the English in 1664. During this 
Dutch period a quasi-feudal society arose around the peculiar Dutch 
entity of the patroon—roughly translated as "lordship"—based on 
ownership of land. Little historical data has been unearthed dealing 
with the politics of the patroon era, but the reigning patroon or lord 
was assisted by an appointive council whose members as a symbol of 
their office were invested with a silver-plated rapier with a baldric, 
as well as a black-hat complete with a plume. No titles, however, were 
ascribed to these men and what influence and position they held is not 
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known. 
After the English takeover British New York began as a proprietary 
colony under the auspices of the Duke of York, the immediate heir to 
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the crown; it remained in that status until he assumed the throne in 
1685. At that time New York automatically became a royal colony. 
Status in seventeenth century New York, political and otherwise, 
was based almost exclusively on land ownership. A manorial neo-feudal 
society arose along the Hudson in the 1670s and 1680s, supplanting the 
old Dutch patroonships. Powerful manorial landlords held great sway 
for a time in and around their vast domains, jealously guarding their 
relatively immense power. This early New York aristocracy lived on its 
manors, in fine European tradition, and by virtue of their social 
position, its members were legally guaranteed seats in the General 
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Assembly, but not on the Council. nevertheless, as one New York 
historian has recently observed, "with the establishment of. . . 
manors, New York was now set on the road toward a legally stratified 
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society. ' These lordships and baronies were passed on to the eldest 
sons through the decidedly feudal holdover of primogeniture and 
entail. No other colonial society could boast of the ready-built legal 
stratification that emerged in the Hudson Valley. Southern and central 
New York, it would seem, would have been more than suitable for the 
development of an American nobility. 
In spite of their lofty positions, the manorial lords' grasp on 
the New York political society was not as solid as one would think. By 
the turn of the century, due in part to steady legislative predation on 
their legal privileges and power — predation encouraged by the envious 
and increasingly expanding heterogeneous population, by near-continuous 
agitation from their landed tenants, by disgruntled, sometimes 
rebellious landless newly-arrived Englishmen, by proponents of land 
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reform in the Assembly, by local governments, and by New Englanders 
infringing upon New Yorkers' lands—the manorial lords increasingly 
lost their early political base, and their economic and social sway. 
Thus, what initially appeared as an excellent opportunity for the 
rise of a provincial nobility, turned once again to failure. New York 
politics by the mid-eighteenth century, partially as a result of the 
precarious position of the elite, became factious, disjointed, and 
chaotic. 
VII 
The settlement and development of a regional elite in New England 
centers on the most studied of all the English colonies, Massachusetts; 
though the other provinces, Rhode Island, Connecticutt and New 
Hampshire, though they did take they lead from the Puritan oligarchy of 
the Bay Colony, should not be forsaken to a Massachusetts myopia. 
Could a provincial nobility have flourished in these areas? The answer 
is yes, it could have, but the fact remains that hereditary authority 
did not arise, although by the turn of the century, as was the case in 
all the colonies, a land-owning, as well as a merchant class elite, was 
in place in all the upper political echelons of the New England 
colonies. 
From Nova Scotia to Connecticut, enterprising members of the 
English gentility cast their eyes toward early settlement in New 
England. They clearly designed to found feudal domains in order to 
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enlarge their dwindling estates and rule over a Utopian empire. Chief 
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among these land hungry, frustrated members of the lower nobility was 
one Sir Ferdinando Gorges. His designs toward the New World were 
representative of others of similar circumstances. 
Gorges, known as "the grand old man" of American exploration and 
promoter of early New England colonization, envisioned a feudal domain 
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in northern America. Gorges's New England, much like those later 
feudalistic adventures to the south, would have been in his own words, 
"divided into Counties, Baronies, Hundreds and the like," with "Lords 
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of Counties" holding the appropriate title of "Lord" as rulers. For 
lack of sound financial backing, however, Gorges's dream. never 
materialized; if it had, New England might well have become a feudal 
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society dominated by a transplanted Stuart nobility. 
By the 1620s some of the displaced English Puritans had begun 
making settlement inroads in the Massachusetts Bay area, eventually 
necessitating the formation of a governing body. Puritan government, 
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is exceedingly complex. Puritan ideas of nobility, however, and its 
role in their world can provide answers as to why no titled aristocracy 
developed in Massachusetts—an absence that would radically affect the 
eighteenth century political developments in the Bay Colony, widely 
characterized as the seedbed of the American Revolution. 
The Puritans, as did all seventeenth century English colonists, 
brought with them well-formulated ideas of the place of rank and 
privilege in society. The English Puritans, as opposed to other, more 
secular groups, looked to an aristocracy of church eldership, an 
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oligarchy as some historians have termed it, for leadership. Their 
ministers, however, warned their flocks not to be fooled by the 
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sometimes misleading grandeur that enveloped those of noble birth and 
blood. Thomas Adams, a Puritan father who remained in London, warned 
his English listeners in 1625 to be wary in their choice of future 
leaders because: 
It is a reverend thing to see an ancient Castle or 
Palace not in decay; or a faire tree, sound and perfect 
timber. But as foule Birds build their nests in an old 
forsaken House, and [decayed] trees are good for nothing 
but the fire; so the decay of Virtue is the ruine of 
nobilitie. . . .Let me see one vir.tue in a man alive, then 
all the rest in his pedigree dead. 63 
His message was clear and echoed by others, the condition of 
church membership, of the aristocrat's soul, and his committment to the 
Puritan religious goals and theology, were much more important than 
pedigree, blood lines, or titles of nobility. Moreover, one of the 
fundamental characteristics of Massachusetts Puritan government, the 
election of members to governmental positions, would determine who 
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ruled and who did not. As a leading Puritan, John Cotton, explained 
in 1636, "Though we [might] receive [nobles] with honour and allow them 
preeminence and accommodations according to their condition. . .we do 
not ordinarily call them forth to the power of election. . .until they 
be received as members into some of our churches. 
This line of thinking presented certain problems and dilemmas for 
the Puritan conscience. Despite their rigorous and disciplined 
theological upbringing and exhortations to the contrary, Puritans, like 
other Englishmen, were enamored with social eminence, titles, and 
lords, especially if they combined their social prominence with Puritan 
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orthodoxy. But to the Massachusetts oligarchy hereditary honors were 
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one thing, hereditary authority quite another, and they strove to 
jealously guard the electoral process in New England. ̂  
This problem was acutely felt in 1636 when two prominent English 
Puritans, Lord Say and Lord Brooke, both peers and members of the House 
of Lords, contemplated emigrating to Massachusetts if certain 
conditions were first met. They wanted an assurance from the 
Massachusetts elders that their hereditary distinction, dignity, and 
authority would accompany them to the New World. The two lords demanded 
"that the commonwealth should consist of two distinct ranks of men. . . 
gentlemen. . .and freeholders," and "that the first rank, consisting 
of gentlemen, should have power, for them and their heirs, to come to 
the parliaments or public assemblies and there give their free votes 
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personally; the second rank. . .by their deputies. 
Cotton and the other elders, after much consternation, 
deliberation, and debate, stood firm. True, he replied in the name of 
the Puritan community, "two distinct ranks we willingly acknowledge, 
from the light of nature and scripture; the one of them called Princes, 
or Nobles, or Elders (amongst whom gentlemen have their place), the 
other people." Cotton contended that "hereditary dignity or honors we 
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willingly allow to the former unless. . .they become degenerate." 
Cotton obviously walked a tightrope; he desired their aristocratic 
presence in New England, as men of such stature could lend credibility 
to the Puritan adventure. He chose his words carefully: "Hereditary 
honors both nature and scripture doth acknowledge," he noted, and 
"where God blessth any branch of any noble or generous family, with a 
spirit and gifts fit for government, it would be taking of God's name 
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in vain to put such a talent under a bushel." Yet, he added, "if God 
should not delight to furnish some of their posterity with gifts fit 
for magistracy" it would not be proper "if we should call them forth, 
when God hath not, to public authority." The colony would be more than 
happy to elect the gentlemen to governmental office, but hereditary 
privilege could not be abided. The two lords took the not-too subtle 
hint, and decided to stay in England.^ 
Thus the Puritan oligarchy side-stepped the necessity of a 
hereditary nobility amidst their presence. A council of magistrates, 
or advisors to the governor would be annually elected in Massachusetts 
by those representative deputies in the Assembly, both houses combined 
would make up the General Court, the prime legislative body in the 
colony. Throughout the many constitutional peregrinations and 
political vicissitudes of the later seventeenth century, among them the 
revoking of the original Massachusetts charter in 1684 by the crown, 
the despotic Governor Andros regime, and the equally ill-fated Dominion 
of New England, the election of the councillor body, unique among 
American colonial governments, remained intact in Massachusetts until 
the Massachusetts Government Act of 1774 took away its elective status 
and left the councillor seats as appointive positions by the crown.^ 
The constitutional development of the other New England colonies, 
New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, with the exception of the 
elective council, was heavily influenced and nearly mirrored that of 
Massachusetts. Like the Bay Colony, and all of the other American 
colonies, a hereditary nobility failed to materialize there. 
In Rhode Island, the receptacle, as one contemporary put it, "of 
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all sorts of riff-raff people. . .and. . .the sewer of New England," 
the Puritan dissident Roger Williams fostered radical ideas of social 
72 
equality not tolerated in Massachusetts Bay. The societal development 
of Rhode Island reflected this somewhat radical philosophy. As in all 
of New England, town government played a crucial role in colonial 
affairs and decision-making. In Rhode Island nearly from the outset of 
colonization the towns were extremely potent forces. As a result, 
seventeenth century Rhode Island political history was marked by the 
colonial government trying to wrest power away from the towns. No 
large landowners, or wealthy merchants emerged until well into the 
eighteenth century and thus could not dominate the political scene as 
they had in other colonies. Simply put, Rhode Island's pattern of 
political development, easily the most chaotic of all the colonial 
governments, could not and did foster any hope of the formation of a 
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provincial nobility. 
Similarly Connecticut, has been hailed by many scholars as the 
most democratic of all the original British New World possessions. 
This was due in large measure to the elective nature of its political 
offices and provisions for a strictly representative government, both 
facets borrowed from its Massachusetts neighbor, and embodied in its 
popular-based constitution, the Fundamental Orders, published in 
1638.74 
Early settlers were drawn from those Massachusetts Puritans 
dissatisfied with the overly repressive society or from restive, 
adventuresome souls lured by the promise of good farming in the virgin 
Connecticut Valley. Though some wealthy families emerged, early 
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Connecticut for the most part was made up of yeoman farmers and no real 
distinctions of wealth marked the social order of the colony/"' As the 
leading colonial Connecticut historian, Richard Bushman, has noted, 
"class distinctions blurred and the ruling families at the top merged 
imperceptibly with the people in posts of lesser dignity directly 
below;. . .the lines that distinguished one man from another were 
indistinct." ̂  
After receiving its formal charter in 1662, the elective 
provisions of the Connecticut Council were abolished, and like all 
other colonies (except Massachusetts), Connecticut's councillors were 
henceforth appointed by the crown. Nobility had had little chance in 
this quasi-democratic stronghold. 
Until the late 1670s, New Hampshire remained tethered to 
Massachusetts and under its political jurisdiction. Much like 
Connecticut and Rhode Island, New Hampshire in its infancy had no 
identifiable elite. In 1679 the home government decreed that New 
Hampshire would thenceforth become a royal province with all the 
features that had come to mark royal governments, namely an appointed 
governor, council, and elected representative assembly. By the 
eighteenth century, however, a wealthy elite had made its fortune in 
white pine timber and had reached the upper echelons of New Hampshire 
politics, particularly council membership.^ Throughout the eighteenth 
century, New Hampshire politics were controlled by the influential 
Wentworth family, and by the middle decades the New Hampshire Council 
had become a powerful patronage tool for the chief executive. Members 
of the governor's immediate family as well as other wealthy provincial 
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families, served on the Council throughout the Wentworth's tenure. 
Thus a self-perpetuating nobility without titles or independence had 
developed in colonial New Hampshire. Limited in influence however, the 
Council was never able to command the respect or win prestige from the 
majority of the population, nor was it able to influence the lower 
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house. Thus, though the elites perhaps gave the superficial 
appearance of a colonial nobility, under the surface they served as 
mere pawns of the various royal governors and could never command the 
respect required to be thought of by others as noblemen. 
VIII 
In seventeenth century New Hampshire, indeed in all of New 
England, and in all of colonial America, Utopian feudal societies 
collapsed or were simply stillborn, mainly because of the inability of 
a primitive America to sustain such adventures. In every colony the 
demographic base was either too small to support such ideas, or the 
population too diverse to acquiesce in schemes such as those proposed 
by John Locke. The sophistication of these Utopian dreams and 
feudalistic aspirations were much too complex for a frontier populace 
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effectively to implement. 
As a result of these collapses, a titled hereditary aristocracy 
failed to materialize in colonial America, its constitutional role 
filled by various men of various means. By the eighteenth century the 
legitimacy of these parvenues, pawns, and increasingly, those sent from 
England to sit in the upper houses, British placemen, created a crisis 
44 
of legitimacy in the various provinces. The councils could not and did 
not provide the necessary constitutional check on the other two 
branches, due to its lack of independence by virtue of its prerogative 
appointive status, or as the case in Massachusettstits elective nature, 
owing its allegiance in that case, to the Assembly. Moreover, the 
favorable economic conditions that blessed colonial America, blurred 
societal distinctions. For many, especially those who had known or 
experienced at least a modicum of prestige and dignity in England, or 
for those Anglicized Americans who cherished English traditions, this 
SO 
blurring represented a serious deparature from English standards. As 
the eighteenth century progressed and the political societies of most 
of the colonies took shape, they disconcertingly seemed to be becoming 
more chaotic, more faction-ridden, more unmanageable, particularly when 
viewed from the governor's and ultimately the crown's perspective. 
Many observers, both in the colonies and Great Britain, pointed to the 
constitutional bastardization of the council—a bastardization that had 
begun in the seventeenth century and continued into the eighteenth—as 
a source for the growing tension and problems that characterized 
imperial relations after mid-century, and especially after 1763. Mixed 
government, theory-obsessed Englishmen both in America and England 
argued, required the three traditional branches, equal in power, and 
mutually checking each other, in order for perfection, harmony, and 
stability to be realized. The American political system had been born 
flawed, and the flaw was traced by many observers to the nature of the 
American royal councils. 
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-CHAPTER THREE -
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ROYAL COUNCIL 
Our forefathers in framing the Constitution of this 
Coun[try], had in view the excellent pattern furnished by 
the Mother Country; But unhappily for us my brother, it is 
an exterior semblence only, when you examine separately the 
parts that compose this government; essential variations 
[emerge] between it, and the happily poised English 
constitution. Let us place the two in comparative points 
of view, and then the difference will be striking. In 
Britain the three simple forms of Monarchy, Aristocracy, 
and Democracy, are so finely blended; that the advantages 
resulting from each species separately flow jointly from 
their admirable union. The King tho' possessing the 
executive power of government, with the third of the 
legislative, and the House of Commons, representing the 
democratic interest, are each prevented from extending 
improperly prerogative or popular claims, by a powerful 
body of nobles, independent in the material circumstances 
of hereditary succession to their titles and seats in the 
second bench of the Legislature. Thus you see of what 
essential importance is the House of Lords in the British 
constitution, and how happily their independence is 
secured. With us, the legislative power is lodged in a 
Governor, Council, and House of Burgesses. The two first 
appointed by the crown, and their places held by the 
precarious tenure of pleasure only. That security 
therefore, which the constitution derives in Britain from 
the House of Lords is here entirely wanting and the just 
equilibrium totally destroyed by two parts out of three of 
the Legislature being in the same hands. 
Richard Henry Lee to brother Arthur Lee, December 20, 1766 
The annual election [of the Council] is the 
canker-worm of the Constitution of this Government. 




By the eighteenth century, most colonial Americans revered the 
English system of mixed government. Most would agree with Boston 
physician and political philosopher William Douglass's assesment that 
"the concurrence of the three forms of government seems to be the 
highest perfection that human civil government can attain. . .1 should 
call it a Trinity in Unity."''" 
How accurate was this statement in its American setting, in light 
of the seventeenth century failure to transplant the second branch of 
this glorious form of government to the New World? How reflective was 
it of the political situation that had evolved by the mid-eighteenth 
century? The answers to these questions require an analysis of the 
theoretical constitutional role of the governor's council in eighteenth 
century America as well as its functions in the English mixed 
government paradigm. Then an examination of the political realities 
and problems caused by the lack of a titled nobility in the councils 
can be focused upon. Some of the political instability that afflicted 
many of the colonies on the eve of the Revolution can be then better 
gauged. 
I 
Americans, one recent scholar has argued, "did not begin to 
concern themselves with the nature of the British constitution until 
2 
the 1720s." Yet, the virtues of mixed government had been espoused 
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since well before the Glorious Revolution in England in the 1680s. 
Politicians, journalists, and clergymen all sang paens of praise to the 
3 
virtues of mixed government. Even the radical Sons of Liberty who 
organized to resist the Stamp Act in 1765 and 1766, summed up the 
thoughts of most Americans before 1776 in their outspoken conviction of 
"the Superior Excellence of the English constitution to that of any 
other form of Government upon Earth. 
Most saw the source of perfection emanating from the balance 
provided by the perpetual check each of the branches imposed on the 
excesses of the others—a check that would ensure tranquility, 
everlasting harmony, and political stability. Most Englishmen, 
Americans included, believed that the historically tested theory had 
ensured the success of the British government during its various 
constitutional crises of the seventeenth century. They felt the 
nobility provided the shock absorber, the screen between the democratic 
element and the monarch, the balancing spoke of the wheel. Many 
observers also noted that without the nobility, the balance would be 
upset and either tyranny or licentious anarchy would result. With that 
constitutional vitiation a form of political slavery would soon follow 
and English political liberties would face extinction. It made good 
sense, then, as the respected philosopher and physician Dr. Samuel 
Johnson pronounced, that the colonial constitutions "should be as near 
as possible, the same with another. . .and conformable to that of the 
mother."^ 
The theory required that a stalwart group of independent, landed 
gentlemen assume vital positions in the second branch, the colonial 
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council. Governors were ordered by royal instructions to choose 
wealthy, loyal colonists for the council positions. In the seventeenth 
century, governors had had a hard time fulfilling these provisions; men 
of good life, loyal to the king and not in debt, were rare. By 
contrast, however, in the eighteenth century the wealthy and propertied 
had multiplied and dominated the membership of the councils. 
Yet as Professor Bernard Bailyn has shown in his seminal work, The 
Origins of American Politics, what Americans thought preserved in their 
governments by theory—the harmonious checks and balance provided by 
the idealistic operation of mixed government—was in reality tenuously 
ensured by other factors. Royal governors, whose political careers 
rested on the stability and efficiency of their respective domains, 
took the lead from eighteenth century English political culture and 
controlled their colonial governments through an informal system of 
patronage politics. Emulating the precedents set by the powerful Whig 
Prime Minister, Sir Robert Walpole, who ruled during the 1720s, 30s and 
40s, royal governors quelled, at least momentarily, the most egregious 
forms of political strife, turmoil, and factionalism, by use of 
patronage, political bargaining and the like. Thus, stability, 
harmony, and political tranquility rested not on the aegis of theory, 
but rather on the ability of the governor to effectively manipulate 
those diverse elements in his administration, namely the colonial 
assemblies and councils. If the governor was skilled and crafty, he 
could ensure, or at least give an outward appearance to the British 
ministry at Whitehall, that his administration was stable and he was 
doing an effective job. But as Bailyn also notes, American politics 
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though perhaps resembling the mother country's on the exterior, 
drastically differed on the interior. 
By the later eighteenth century, governors, for a variety of 
reasons, found they could not control, or "corrupt" in the eighteenth 
century phrase, the bodies over which they ruled as effectively as 
their English counterparts. Except perhaps for council members and 
other minor officials, who owed their positions directly to the 
governor who appointed them, governors, for the most part, operated 
with limited patronage. Political turmoil, and the dreaded factional, 
party-spirited nature of American colonial politics, as a result, 
plagued most colonial administrations after mid-century.^ The many 
problems inherent in the royal councils of the eighteenth century 
contributed substantially to this "chaotic factionalism," as Bailyn 
g 
describes it, that emerged on the eve of the Revolution. 
II 
During the 1760s numerous political leaders and thinkers began 
noticing fundamental problems in the American mixed governments. Their 
basic constitutional structure was not, to be sure, a replica in 
miniature of England's. They were not in fact balanced nor mixed. The 
king's vicegerent, was indeed present in the person of the royal 
governor, a direct representation of the monarchical branch. And the 
democratic element—the Assembly—made for a tangible facsimile of the 
House of Commons. But the shock-absorbers in the middle, the councils, 
embodying the aristocratic portion of the colonial governments, seemed 
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to have degenerated and had interests either indistinguishable from the 
colonial assemblies or had become pawns of the crown; their role and 
function in providing balance did not seem equal to that of the House 
of Lords. 
How had the councils reached such a state? More importantly, was 
their growing ineffectiveness in ameliorating the increasing turmoil 
between popularly elected assemblies and staunchly prerogative-minded 
governors an actual cause of colonial political strife, particularly 
after 1763 when Britain became more imperially active toward her 
American colonies? Or was their presence and independence vital at 
all? 
Throughout the eighteenth century political commentators noted 
England's failure to create strong, independent royal councils. This 
lack of independency had led to problems in the second branch, 
especially with their dealings with governors, who by royal 
instruction, could veto their positions on the council and dismiss them 
for even slight indiscretions. Writing in 1747, William Douglass of 
Boston noted that "there are Inconveniences in the Constitution 
[regarding the Council]; they may be Intimidated by the first Negative, 
the Governor, as he has a Power of negativing any Councellor's Election 
without adducing Reasons;. . .thus, they appear not to be free 
^ »9 agents. 
With an impotent council in his pocket, some felt that the 
governor could operate unchecked, devising whimsical schemes to enrich 
or reduce his colony to political slavery. The idea of this defect 
became more pronounced in the 1760s and 70s when colonists, recently 
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versed in traditional Whig opposition thought or "country" ideology, 
were taught to be on the lookout for arbitrary, despotic power. 
Maryland opposition leader Charles Carroll made his readers aware of 
this fact in a 1773 essay in which he warned that "the government is 
almost independent of the people. . .and every day gain[s] some 
accession of strength; we have no intermediate state," he lamented, "to 
check its progress: the upper house, the shadow of an aristocracy, 
being composed of officers dependent on the proprietary and removable 
at pleasure, will, it is feared, be subservient to his pleasure and 
command."^ How this stage had been reached in America can be easily 
ascertained, given the nature of the governor's orders, his position in 
the Empire and the politics he was required to play. 
Royal governors were prescribed by their orders to appoint 
councillors "well affected to the government," in other words, strong 
men whom the governor felt would support the royal prerogative. These 
council members, thus owed their positions entirely to the governor, 
except in Massachusetts where they were annually elected by the House 
of Representatives. Many sided with the governor on issues of 
significance and as a result disaffected their counterparts in the 
lower houses of assembly.'''''' By the 1760s royal governors and councils 
in most colonies were pitted against opposition strongholds, the 
assemblies. Imperial officials could only observe this factionalism 
12 
and affix blame on the governor. Customs official William Knox 
directed his thoughts toward this situation in 1775. "A middle estate 
has indeed been formed," he wrote, "called his Majesty's Council, by 
way of apology for an aristocratic power, to act in the double capacty 
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of a branch of the legislature (the upper house), and Privy Council to 
the Governor." "The influence of this body however," he continued, "is 
too inconsiderable to give the Crown or its Governor any effectual 
«. -.13 support. 
The governor's position was somewhat untenable. To appoint men of 
opposition ilk would not only go against his instructions, but endanger 
his position regarding the Assembly, as he did not want to strengthen 
it by any means. In that the governor could not control the colonial 
political machinery as satisfactorily as did his English counterparts 
and given the fact that he had only limited patronage to utilize, his 
only recourse was to search out loyal prerogative allies, even at the 
14 
risk of upsetting the vaunted balance. 
Compounding the governor's councillor dilemma was the imposition 
of English and in the case of some southern colonies, Scottish placemen 
to fill council seats.^ Throughout the eighteenth century, council 
seats and other appointive posts such as judgeships, sheriffs, and 
attorney generalships, had provided the crown with a limited source of 
patronage."^ As a result, the colonies were besieged by imperial 
officials, usually necessitous lower aristocrats, who sought to enrich 
their private estates through the service on the various councils, 
particularly those in the southern colonies where in some cases their 
membership reached as high as forty percent of the total.^ 
But more important than patronage, placemen were sent to the 
colonies in the late 1740s and 50s after a series of political and 
social explosions had rocked the New World governments and had led many 
in the ministry to conclude that the Americans were incapable of 
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self-rule. The colonial historian Jack P. Greene reports that: 
During the late 1740s and early 1750s. . .violent 
factional disputes had thrown New Jersey into civil war, 
put an end to all legislative activity in New Hampshire and 
North Carolina, and seriously weakened the position of 
royal administration in Jamaica, Bermuda, and New York. 
From New York, South Carolina, New Jersey, Bermuda, 
Jaimaca, North Carolina and New Hampshire—from all the 
royal colonies except Massachusetts whose problems were 
beginning to surface, and Virginia, Barbados, and the 
Leeward Islands—governors complained that they were 
powerless to carry out impe^al directions against the 
opposition of local interests. 
The appointment of placemen, many hoped, would remedy this 
volatile situation. Though they did initially stabilize the English 
home government by pacifying disgruntled opposition members in England, 
placemen had the opposite effect in America. The presence of these 
loyal prerogative men deprived the governor of a much-needed source of 
local patronage—patronage in many instances used to reward and 
influence wealthy and influential members of the colonial community and 
sway recalcitrant native elites to the crown position. And, moreover, 
these "parliamentary beggars," as one English historian has referred to 
them, denied those aspiring, ambitious members of the colonial 
aristocracy, those considered during the eighteenth century by both 
themselves and members of the lower classes as the natural leaders of 
society, positions on the council. These positions the American elite 
19 
had come to traditionally view as its by traditional right. Placemen 
were loathed by these native elites and were a source of constant 
irritation among the Americans who viewed them as intruders. Native 
South Carolinian councilman, William Drayton, complained in 1774 that 
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"Placemen dependent upon the Crown, being Strangers ignorant of the 
interests and laws of the Colonies, are sent from England to fill seats 
20 
in [the] Council." Furthermore, the mere presence of these intruders 
engendered not only feelings of anger and hostility on the part of the 
native colonial elite, but after time, feelings of deep-seated 
inferiority. 
For an inter-colonial aristocracy that had stabilized itself since 
its rather turbulent seventeenth century inception, a seat on the 
council, even though it might have meant bowing to the wishes of a 
sometimes less-than-universally respected royal governor, did afford 
the elites some measure of provincial societal status and was generally 
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accepted as the mark of a competent political ruler. In addition, by 
aspiring to competency, and by achieving self-rule, those of the upper 
strata could look with pride at the success they had achieved at 
22 
Anglicizing themselves—becoming more like their English cousins. 
Reports of political turmoil that reached the ministry, they asserted, 
were usually blown out of proportion or productions of the imagination 
of conniving court favorites who aspired to lucrative positions within 
the Empire. The colonial governments, it was argued, had also displayed 
a remarkable capacity for the resolution of internal conflicts and 
23 
therefore placemen were wholly unnecessary. 
The introduction of royal office-jobbers also violated the 
long-standing tradition of "salutary neglect" practiced by the British 
government toward the colonies. Ever since the downfall of the 
Dominion of New England in the 1690s, Britain, for the most part, had 
left the governing of the colonies, except in the appointment of royal 
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governors, to locally elected assemblies and councillors appointed from 
the native aristocracies. These aristocracts had experienced a 
dramatic increase in wealth and social status during the first decades 
24 
of the century. Placemen, thus, flew in the face of colonial 
expectations, detracted from the local elites' self-esteem, and 
fostered a sense of inferiority among colonial aristocrats. John 
Adams's emotional rumination in 1774 exemplifies this feeling. "We are 
not men, fit for the Times. We are deficient in Genius, in Education, 
25 
in Travel, in Fortune—in every thing. I feel unutterable Anxiety." 
Because of this rising disaffection, the introduction of British 
officials into the councils had the opposite and unintended effect of 
alienating many of the American elites from the prerogative position 
and driving their loyalties toward those expressed by the colonial 
assemblies. These assemblies were reflecting the opinions and views of 
country ideology, held by a growing mass of their constituency. A 
balanced constitution with a strong, competent (but virtuous) elite, 
was a tenet of this burgeoning ideology and placemen were increasingly 
viewed as royal usurpers, greedy officials sent by a scheming 
26 
ministry. Inclinations of inferiority became more hostile and the 
merging of councillor interests with those of the assemblies became 
nearly colony-wide by the 1770s, except where those councils were 
27 
dominated by royal placemen. 
Yet what other path could the British ministry have taken? 
Placemen who backed strong prerogative governors could help provide an 
important enforcement mechanism for the new imperial measures 
28 
contemplated in the 1750s and 60s. Doing nothing, on the other hand, 
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in the face of either perceived or real political instability would 
have sent a signal to the colonists that they were indeed competent 
rulers and could continue self-rule, no matter what the situtation. 
But that option could not be countenanced; the Americans were like 
wayward children, as the popular metaphor went, and had to be 
29 
supervised at every step by the omnipotent parent. To do nothing 
would be to imply competency in the face of inefficiency, or worse, 
equality with the always-efficient and correct mother country. 
Equality, naturally, to stretch the metaphor further, would soon lead 
to thoughts of independence. 
One can deduce from this extension of logic why no significant 
proposals came from Britain in these pre-Revolutionary years to create 
an independent American nobility to bolster the councils. An American 
nobility would have meant that Americans, parvenues .at best, social 
barbarians at worst, might very well believe themselves to be on the 
same footing as the venerable peers of the English Empire. In the early 
to mid-eighteenth century, this was unthinkable in most circles. By 
the 1760s and 70s however, when Anglo-American problems had been 
strained to their limit, officials both in America and later in Britain 
began to second guess the wisdom of their philosophy. American 
observers, loyalists and opposition alike, searched for various 
measures to relieve the building tension. Placemen sent to stabilize 
the colonial governments had not really seemed the solution; they had, 
if anything, exacerbated the situation. American mixed governments had 
become indelibly flawed and needed repair. Even more important, the 
most influential men in the colonies, the wealthy, home-grown but 
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alienated American aristocracy—respected men who, if catered to, might 
support the royal prerogative instead of opposing it—needed to be 
brought back to the fold. Enticements of baronets, knighthood and 
esquires might prove the answer. 
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- CHAPTER FOUR -
REMEDIES AND ENTICEMENTS 
The Delinquency in the Council is become so general, 
that it is not in the power of the Governor to correct it 
by Negatives. . . .The Reformation of the Council must now 
be made. 
Francis Bernard to Secretary of War, Lord Hillsborough, 1769 
In the early summer of 1764, Francis Bernard, esquire, the 
incumbent royal governor of Massachusetts, a figure described by one 
historian as "an English gentlemen of third-rate abilities," penned one 
of his numerous pieces of correspondence to the British ministry on the 
state of government in the Bay Colony.'*" Contained in this particular 
letter, addressed to his wife's cousin, the influential Lord 
Barrington, a member of Parliament and Secretary of War, was an 
extended essay the governor had written in the spring entitled, 
"Principles of Law and Polity, Applied to the Government of the British 
2 
Colonies in America." Bernard had gotten wind of impending imperial 
reform and new revenue-generating measures contemplated in Great 
Britain for implementation in the colonies within the year. The 
governor was not philosophically opposed to some degree of colonial 
reform and reorganization. Indeed, during the first several years of 
his administration (he had come to the office in 1760), when he was not 
jousting with the influential Otis Family over provincial politics, he 
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spent a great amount of time and spilled a copious amount of ink musing 
over various notions of how the British government might reform and 
reorganize the economic, political, and social structure of her 
colonial holdings. However, before some form of parliamentary taxation 
should take place, he strongly felt that a general reorganization of 
the American governments, particularly in his domain, must first 
occur. Several years previously he had written to Lord Barrington 
that, "A new establishment of the governments. . .in America," should 
first be undertaken to ensure that the various polities rested "upon a 
true English constitutional bottom." "New England," he urged, was "the 
.. 3 
proper place to begin the process. The basic colonial policy of 
salutary neglect that Britain had practiced throughout the eighteenth 
century had to be restructured to ensure maximum efficiency with a 
minimal degree of trouble. Minds such as Bernard's could be put to 
good use, especially since he had witnessed first-hand the daily 
operation of one of the Empire's most important colonial holdings. In 
the spring of 1764 with this reformation in mind, Bernard presented his 
research to the ministry in the form of ninety-seven detailed 
propositions which he entitled, "Principles of Law and Polity." 
Not many of the governor's ideas were remarkably new or original. 
"The Sovereignty of Great Britain is in the King of Parliament," he 
wrote, "The King in Parliament is sole and absolute Sovereign of the 
4 
whole British Empire, and so on. In a later proposition, however, he 
anticipated the key issue of the looming Stamp Act imbroglio: "The 
Parliament of Great Britain. . .has a right to. . .impose taxes upon 
its subjects in its external dominions, although they are not 
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represented in such Parliament." But after three years in America, 
Bernard was quick to add that "A Representation of the American 
Colonies in the Imperial Legislature is not impracticable," and would 
benefit Anglo-American relations. ̂  
But it was the propositions he numbered eighty-six through 
eighty-nine that proved the most profound and far-reaching of any and 
thus merit considerable attention. They read: 
There is no government in America at present, whose 
powers are properly balanced; there not being in any of 
them a real and distinct third legislative power mediating 
between the king and the people, which is the peculiar 
excellence of the British consititution. The want of such 
a third legislative power adds weight to the popular, and 
lightens the royal scale, so as to destroy the balance 
between the royal and popular powers. Although America is 
not now, ('and probably will not be for many years to come) 
ripe enough for a hereditary nobility, yet is now capable 
of a nobility for life. A nobility appointed by the king 
for life, and made independent, would probably give 
strength and stability to the American governments as 
effectually as a hereditary nobility does to that of Great 
Britain. ̂  
Lord Barrington received Bernard's letter and accompanying 
proposals later in the summer and promptly showed the letter to Lord 
Halifax, the Secretary of State, "who admire[d] it greatly, and sa[id] 
it was the best thing of the kind he ever read." Barrington was 
persuaded that Lord Hillsborough, soon to become Secretary of War, 
7 
would, "not give it less commendation." 
The governor fancied his plans as "a refined stroke of policy" and 
anxiously awaited his orders home so he could provide expert guidance 
8 
as to the fine points of reorganizing America. Yet despite the 
favorable impressions Bernard's plans made on the Secretary of State 
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and others, the governor did not at that time receive the ticket home 
for which he so desperately yearned. The ministry had gotten involved 
in other aspects of imperial reform and after a shifting of personnel, 
9 
Bernard's plans were set aside-. This served only to fuel Bernard's 
prolixity. Undaunted, the governor's ninety-seven principals, 
especially his scheme for an independent American nobility, remained a 
central portion of his political philosophy and a foremost object of 
his many letters to England during his American tenure until his recall 
in 1769. Two obvious points beg answering: Why had Bernard (and shortly 
thereafter others) come to this position, and what became of these 
ideas? 
I 
It would be convienent to explain away Governor Bernard' s 
proposals as mere follies engineered by a British courtier designed to 
catch the eye of his superiors in Great Britain. True, Bernard did want 
to make himself known in British ministerial circles in order to work 
his way up the imperial hierarchy. However, the governor was in fact 
ardently patriotic and did sincerely desire to facilitate the smooth 
operation of the colonial governments, especially his own, if for no 
reason than to shed favorable light on his position. But to do so he 
first had to completely rehaul the constitution of the Massachusetts 
government. 
The Bay Colony's political system had evolved no differently than 
any other colony's, except in one aspect—an aspect that would plague 
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Bernard until his departure in 1769 — and that provided the basis for 
his ideas of American nobility. In all of the other American 
governments the council had become an appointive position to be filled 
by men chosen by the governor and approved (usually automatically) by 
the Privy Council in Great Britain. ̂  This was not the case in 
Massachusetts however, where the Council was a body elected by the 
House of Representatives, sitting with the outgoing Council, a holdover 
from the Puritan tradition of the early seventeenth century and 
validated by the Massachusetts Royal Charter of 1691. The governor 
could pre-emptorily negate their election, but he could not choose his 
own members. ^ 
During the early stages of the eighteenth century the Council 
usually aligned itself with the governor as other colonial councils had 
12 
done. The chief executive, moreover, held the power to appoint 
councillors to other lucrative and influential provincial posts, among 
13 
them judgeships and the attorney generalship. Bernard's predecessors 
had skillfully used these appointments to make up for the loss of 
patronage that resulted from the election process. But early in his 
administration Bernard had blundered when he appointed the multiple 
office-holding Thomas Hutchinson to the position of chief justice. In 
the process, Bernard incurred the wrath of the powerful Otis family, of 
which the patriarch, James, Sr., had been previously promised the 
position by a former royal governor. Henceforth, the Otis-controlled 
opposition in the House of Representatives—an opposition recently 
groomed in country ideology, and increasingly stiffened when confronted 
with new parliamentary taxation or other prerogative measures, now 
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battled the governor at every turn. ̂  
As the ranks of this opposition swelled, the annual election of 
the Council began to reflect its increase. From the Stamp Act Crisis 
of 1765, to the Massachusetts Governing Act of 1774, when Parliament 
belatedly reorganized the provincial Council, the House repeatedly 
elected a preponderance of councillors who were, if not outright hostile 
to Bernard, were at least sympathetic in some degree to the 
opposition. Bernard had the right to dismiss councillors whom he 
deemed unfavorable or undesirable and he did so with alarming and 
ultimately debilitating frequency. At one point in 1769, when public 
opinion had polarized against the governor due to his support of royal 
policies, the governor and Assembly could agree on only sixteen of the 
15 
necessary twenty-eight councillors. 
After the 1768 election in the midst of the Townshend Crisis, 
Bernard lamented to Britain that, "The Council [has] suffered so great 
a change that they don't appear to be the same persons and I can no 
longer depend upon them for that Assistance which I have been used to 
expect and often to receive from them in support of the. . .Crown. f  
[They feel] that it is high time that they should take care of their 
interests with the prevailing Party of the People." "To govern without 
an effective council," he contended was "to make bricks without 
straw.Not only was Bernard forced to govern with limited advice, 
but his actions vis-a-vis the Council signaled to the ministry a 
growing ineffectiveness of Bernard's regime. The ambitious and 




Beginning with his 1764 treatise, "Principles of Law and Polity" 
and not ending until his 1769 departure, Governor Bernard feverishly 
and unsuccessfully tried to persuade the ministry to solve the flaw in 
the Massachusetts government. Time and again he complained to Britain 
that: "The Government is weak and impotent to an amazing degree." 
Moreover, "the popular scale [is] so much weightier than the Royal, 
that it require[s] Address and Management and frequent temporizing to 
preserve a Tolerable Balance"A fatal ingredient in the Composition 
of this Government," he remonstrated, "has been the making of the 
King's Council annually elective," because, "the annual election of 
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[the Council] is the canker-worm of. . .this Government." 
In March of 1768 he complained to the ministry of "the 
constitutional imbecility of the Council." Later in the year he 
informed Lord Hillsborough that it was the "melancholik truth that this 
Government. . .will never recover until some amendment is made in the 
Constitution [stabilizing] the Council." Shortly thereafter in another 
letter to Hillsborough, and while mired in the midst of the controversy 
over the quartering of British troops in Boston, Bernard felt sure the 
province teetered on the verge of anarchy and that, "The Council, who 
are themselves the creatures of the peple, will never join the Governor 
in censuring the overflowings of Liberty." Bernard's solution had 
remained unchanged since 1764: Britain should create an independent 
19 
upper house composed of an American nobility. 
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Outlined many times, Bernard's scheme varied little throughout his 
tenure. "Counsellors in character," he explained, "Must be. . . 
prudent men," which Bernard's in Massachusetts definitely were not. 
Only the wisest, the wealthiest, and those most loyal to the crown 
could be considered for such a high distinction. But choosing men for 
a nobility was "delicate business," and "some [present councillors]. . . 
must be positively excluded." Exactly who those were, Bernard had a 
hard time saying because, "To enter into Distinctions of Persons is a 
difficult and disagreeable Task." ̂  
After much consternation, Bernard decided at least that, 
"Gentlemen settled and estated in the Province," should be appointed, 
"avoiding those who are seen as strangers here." "To enhance the[ir] 
value," moreover, "it may be proper," he conjectured, "to allow a Title 
to the Members of the Upper House, such as Baron prefixed to their 
name, which is no more than a Lord of a Manor in England has a right 
to." Bernard's American peers would therefore not tread on or threaten 
the long-established English peerage. The governor himself had "no 
appetite for honors" but when offered a Baronet from the ministry he 
did not hesitate in accepting it (at Hillsborough's expense), feeling 
it "will probably strengthen my hands in the Service of the 
21 
Government." 
Bernard eventually formulated a list of twelve potential noblemen 
which read like a virtual who's who of New England loyalists. Among 
the lucky candidates were the governor's staunchest allies, including 
the plural office-holding lieutenant governor, Thomas Hutchinson, the 
Provincial Secretary and the original Stamp Act duties collector, the 
76 
unpopular Andrew Oliver, the new chief justice, Peter Oliver, other 
wealthy merchants, and some eminent but recently deposed Council 
members.^ 
Unfortunately for the beleaguered governor, Bernard's plans were 
never seriously considered in Parliament until 1774 when the 
Massachusetts Governing Act, part of the Coercive Acts, stripped 
Massachusetts of its right to annually elect the Council and installed 
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instead a royally appointive mandamus council. By this juncture, 
however, the reconstruction of the colonial socio-political structure 
was among the least of the ministry's worries, as new debates on the 
propriety of further taxation and impending military deployments took 
precedence. 
As for Governor Bernard, after facing overwhelming opposition to 
British policy he was forced to uphold for nearly six years, the 
ministry finally recalled him in 1769 under the pretext of advising 
them ostensibly on colonial affairs. He left Massachusetts in disgrace 
in July, 1769, after having been in effect impeached by the House of 
Representatives by a vote of 109-0 for his role in the quartering of 
troops in Boston and other political blunders during the previous 
years. Knighted in Britain for his troubles, "the roast-beef of a man" 
as one historian has portrayed him, continued to agitate unsuccessfully 
for colonial reform. His private correspondence, favoring an American 
nobility was not published until 1774 and it was only then that 
Americans learned of his schemes. However, they generated little 
response from an American populace caught up with other more pressing 





Plans for an American nobility were not confined to those 
formulated by Governor Bernard. In the 1760s numerous officials in the 
colonies began correctly identifying the flawed constitutional 
structure and urged similar measures along Bernard's lines. 
Bernard's lieutenant governor, Thomas Hutchinson, who was 
appointed governor in 1770 after his predecessor's departure, 
vacillated on the issue. In 1769 he wrote a colleague that, "I am not 
desirous of a change in the Constitution. I have not been so much 
provoked as the Governor (Bernard) has been. . .[as] I have 
attachments to the old modes and customs." Yet in 1770 when he faced 
the same unruly and unmanageable Council Bernard had faced, his 
position altered somewhat. ̂  
After coming to office, Hutchinson wrote the ministry urging that 
the king thereafter appoint the Massachusets councillors. As a result 
of this variation the Council could then become, "rather serviceable to 
the Governor." In addition, to gain favor with the most influential 
members of the New England community, Hutchinson believed that although 
places and titles in the colonies were not hereditary, many of the 
wealthy and their descendants had "done worthily and had some claim to 
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be distinguished. Andrew Oliver, the Massachusetts Provincial 
Secretary and a member of Bernard's "junto," in 1770 wrote to the 
ministry in direct, straightforward language: 
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If there should be a reform of any of the colony 
charters with a view to keep up the resemblance of the 
three estates in England, the legislative council should 
consist of men of landed estates... .There is no way now to 
put a man of fortune above the common level and exempt him 
from being chosen by the people into the lower offices. 
"For remedy," Oliver suggested that, "an order of Patricians or 
Esquires be instituted, to be all men of fortune, or good landed 
estates." These patricians, he believed, "would rank above the body 
from which they were taken, they might bear a title one degree above 
that of esquire." Men of "character and reputation" would thus be 
distinguished, government would be "more respectable," and in turn 
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produce a "healthful constitution of the whole [governmental] body." 
Nor were the advocates of a colonial nobility confined solely to 
the boundaries of the Bay Colony. Writing from Maryland in 1770, 
British visitor and nobleman William Eddis wrote that, "had an order of 
nobility been created. . .at an early period it would most assuredly 
have greatly tended to cherish a steady adherence to monarchical 
principles. . .[because] inattention to principles of such importance 
has gradually given birth to sentiments totally repugnant to the genius 
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of our most excellent constitution [namely] a republican spirit." 
From New York, an antagonist to the outspoken opposition essayist, 
Alexander McDougall, anonymously published the pamphlet entitled, The 
Dougliad. In it the writer placed the blame for most of America's 
troubles with Britain on the fact that "an August peerage," which 
"forces a Barrier between the Prince and the People," and forms an 
"impregnable Bulwark," against "perdition, does not obtain, with its 
due Weight in the Royal Colonies. . . ." "God forbid," he bemoaned, 
"that we should ever be so miserable to sink into a Republick!" Rather, 
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"let us hope," that "with the increase of Numbers and opulence," we 
aspire "to a perfect copy of that bright original, which is the Envy 
and Admiration of the World. . . .With their offices. . .why need we 
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despair of so desirable an event!" 
New York governor William Smith also recognized the American 
constitutional defect; he, like several others of the Revolutionary era 
suggested a remedy in the form of a colonial union of all the American 
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governments. Smith s union would consolidate. . .all these little 
continental Parliaments (i.e., the various assemblies, councils, and 
governors) into one." "A Council of at least twenty-four members," he 
explained, "appointed by the Crown with a House of Commons consisting 
of Deputies. . ." would "meet as the Parliament of North America. . . ." 
"The Number of the Council," he continued, "may depend upon the 
Royal Pleasure; but to preserve their Independency they ought to be Men 
of Fortune, and hold their places for Life; with some honorable 
Distinctions to their Families, as a Lure to prevent the office from 
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falling into Contempt." 
Sir Egerton Leigh, a British placeman serving on the South 
Carolina council, expressed similar opinions in an essay on the 
colonial political structure. He wrote: 
A body of. . .Counsellors. . .appointed by the King 
from the first rank of the People, most distinguished for 
their Wealth, Merit, and Ability, would be a means of 
diffusing a considerable influence through every order of 
Persons in the Community. . . .This body. . .ought to be 
made independent, by holding that station during the term 
of their natural lives. . . .The Life-Tenure. . .would 
sufficiently secure that Independency which is so 
necessary. . .and so agreeable to the Constitution of the 
Parent-State. 
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Leigh added that, "When time shall ripen and make us Independent, 
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we may aspire to Dukedoms and pant for Lordships."' 
Not until the mi.d-1770s however, did officials in Great Britain 
take heed. The English nobleman Sir John Dalrymple, in his pamphlet, 
The Address of the People of Great Britain to the Inhabitants of 
America, published in 1775, explained to Americans that "every honour 
of this Country is open to you." "We would even be happy," he added, 
"to seek you ask the establishment of a nobility, and of ranks among 
yourselves."^ 
Not every Englishman, though, shared Dalrymple's desire. Writing 
from New York, the fierce loyalist, Thomas Bradbury Chandler, scoffed 
at the thought of Americans sharing in English honors. In his 1775 
broadside aimed at the Continental Congress, Bradbury left few of his 
thoughts to imagination: 
The way being thus prepared, by an entire demolition 
of the authority of Parliament over the Colonies, and by a 
diminution of that of the King; the next part of the plan 
is, to make provision for enlarging the authority and 
dignity of the members of Congress and some of their 
friends. . .an American House of Lords is in agitation; in 
which the members must have the same rights, privileges, 
and honours, which the English constitution has given to 
the members of the House of Lords. . . .They must continue 
for Life; . . .their rights and titles must descent to 
their heirs. . .forever and ever. These must, I suppose, 
be the same Orders of the American nobility, that belong to 
the English; and then none can dispute or question, that 
the gentlemen of the Congress will have a right to the 
highest order.35 
"I am ravished and transported at the foresight of this American 
grandeur," he continued, "Oh! how we shall shine with Dukes of America! 
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There will be no less than fifty-three of them. . . ." "The Committees 
of Correspondence," he sardonically concluded, "will furnish us with 
marquises; and the Committees of Observation with Earls. The Viscounts 
may consist of Heros that are famed for their exploits in tarring and 
feathering; and the barons, or lowest order, of those whose merit has 
been signalized in burning such pamphlets as they are unable to 
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answer. 
Not until 1774, during debate on the reform of the Massachusetts 
government, did members of Parliament voice their mild concern over the 
absence of an American nobility. "I would wish to bring the 
constitution of America as similar to our own as possible," announced 
Lord George Sackville, "I would wish to see the council of that country 
similar to a House of Lords in this." During the same debate, the 
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Prime Minister, Lord North, echoed Sacville's sentiments. 
The fruits of their debate, the Massachusetts Governing Act, which 
contained a provision for a royally appointed council, proved entirely 
ineffectual and generated open, sometimes violent, animosity in 
Massachusetts and other colonies. What the various advocates of a 
colonial hereditary nobility—from a lukewarm Parliament all the way 
down to lowly Governor Bernard—had failed to gauge, was the effects of 
a new radical political philosophy on the collective political and 
social conscience of Americans. For hitherto commonly accepted ideas of 
artificial distinctions, ranks, titles, privilege, and inequality based 
solely upon birth were directly antithetical, even outright hostile to 
the burgeoning ideology of republicanism. Neither an English king nor 
an American nobility could survive in its wake. 
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- CHAPTER FIVE -
THE REPUBLICAN DETERRENT 
To the evil of monarchy we have added that of 
hereditary succession;. . .claimed as a matter of right, 
[it] is an insult and an imposition on posterity. For all 
men being originally equals, no one by birth could have a 
right to set up his own family in perpetual preference to 
all others for ever. 
Thomas Paine, Common Sense, 1276 
A fool. . .has great need of a title. It teaches Men 
to call him Count and Duke and to forget his proper name of 
fool. 
William Livingston, The Independent Reflector, 1753 
An American version of the English titled nobility failed to 
develop in the seventeenth century because the British peerage, fearing 
competition from American parvenues, would not countenance its 
institution, and because the raw, frontier conditions of the New World 
did not provide a favorable medium for its development. In the 
eighteenth century, despite what recent historians have termed a 
"feudal revival" erupting throughout the colonies, despite a worship 
and yearning by Anglo-Americans for British culture and institutions, 
and despite frenetic pleas from imperial officials like Governor 
Bernard for an American nobility, it failed to develop just as it had 
in the seventeenth century.^ The reason for that failure, however, was 
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dramatically different; a republican-spirited populace would not allow 
one to take root. On the eve of the American Revolution, 
republicanism, a set of ideas that collided headlong and then 
overwhelmed the prevailing Anglicization and feudal revival, was the 
chief obstacle to the growth and evolution of an American hereditary 
aristocracy. 
I 
Much of the success of Tom Paine's explosive pamphlet, Common 
Sense, published in January, 1776, can be attributed to his remarkable 
ability to give cogent expression to feelings and attitudes many 
Americans privately fostered, especially the political ideology of 
republicanism. Paine, moreover, was also one of the first pamphleteers 
to directly attack the notion of hereditary authority and succession; 
it had corrputed the fiber of European society. The absence of 
distinctions and societal ranks, he argued, was vital to the successful 
development of republicanism, an ideology that had slowly evolved in 
America in the past decade and flourished after the publication of his 
monumental pamphlet, soon coming to dominate American political 
thought. Paine, with the publication of Common Sense, effectively 
destroyed any glimmer of hope that English minds had harbored towards 
the establishment of an American nobility, and he had done so by 
articulating American perceptions that had been forming at least 
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several decades prior to 1776. 
The evolution of republican thought prior to the American 
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Revolution is a twisted and controversial topic, of which an extended 
3 
analysis is entirely beyond the purview of this study. Several general 
comments, however, need to be proffered in order better to understand 
the various responses of Americans to the idea of hereditary authority 
and aristocracy rule. 
As the new historical progenitors of republicanism have pointed 
out, eighteenth century Americans drew heavily from the English 
libertarian political and social thinkers in formulating their own 
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political ideology. The historian, Robert Shalhope, encapsulates the 
philosophy of republicanism in a recent historiographical survey. He 
explains that: 
Colonial spokesmen, drawing deeply on the libertarian 
thought of the English commonwealthmen, embraced a 
distinctive set of political and social attitudes and that 
these attitudes permeated their society. Believing that 
history revealed a continual struggle between the spheres 
of liberty and power, the American Revolutionaries quickly 
formed a consensus in which the concept of republicanism 
epitomized the new social and political world they believed 
they had created. Preserving a republican polity meant 
protecting liberty from the ceaseless aggression of power. 
In addition, Americans believed that what made republics 
great or ultimately destroyed them was not the force of 
arms but the character and spirit of the people. Public 
virtue, as the essential prerequisite for good government, 
was all-important. A people practicing frugality, 
industry, temperance, and simplicity were sound republican 
stock, while those who wallowed in luxury were corrupt and 
would corrupt others. Since furthering the public 
good—the exclusive purpose of republican 
government—required the constant sacrifice of individual 
interests to the greater needs of the whole, the people, 
conceived of as a homogeneous body (especially when set 
against their rulers), became the great determinant of 
whether a republic lived or died. Thus republicanism meant 
maintaining public and private virtue, internal unity, 
social solidarity, and vigilance against the corruptions of 
power. United in this frame of mind, Americans set out to 
gain their independence and then to establish a new 
republic. 
Yet, when tracing the republican-colored American response to the 
imposition of a crown-appointed aristocracy, one must bear in mind 
that, though notions of human equality later became a chief facet of 
republican ideology, aristocratic rule based on merit and ability were 
not attacked. As the historian Gordon Wood has indicated, "The 
republicanism of the Revolution was not for most Americans directed at 
aristocracy per se." Rule by the "better sort," by the nobility of 
society, was thought essential to the maintenance of free and efficient 
government.^ America on the eve of the Revolution and afterwards, was 
indeed a deferential, not a democratic, society and had been that way 
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since its seventeenth century birth. In 1768 a Virginian summarized 
this nearly universally accepted attitude: 
It is right that men of birth and fortune, in every 
government that is free, should be invested with power, and 
enjoy higher honors than the people. If it were otherwise, 
their privileges would be less, and they would not enjoy an 
equal degree of liberty with the people. ̂  
Fellow Virginian and leading aristocrat, Landon Carter echoed 
these views. "It was the upper classes," he concluded, "that a country 
looked to for prudent advice and assistance," and "for patterns or 
examples. 
Even many of the Whig and country thinkers in Europe and America 
who would later become the harbingers of the American Revolution had at 
the heart of their social credo the notion that a deferential hierarchy 
and social inequality were absolute requisites for a free society. The 
best gentlemen, it was widely believed, should rule and common citizens 
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automatically and unquestioningly deferred to these elites. Even one 
of the most radical and caustic of the early American country thinkers, 
the journalist William Livingston, admitted that the "Supreme Governor 
of the Universe," has decreed "superiority and pre-eminence in some, 
and dependence and subjection in others."'''''" 
II 
Some fissures had begun to appear, however, in these widely 
accepted attitudes as far back as the 1720s. From the barbed pens of 
two of the more famous of the English libertarian thinkers, John 
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, came Cato's Letters, a series of essays 
directed against many facets of the English socio-political system but 
primarily aimed at the corrupt administration of the incumbent Prime 
Minister, Sir Robert Walpole. 
Cato's Letters were printed widely throughout the colonies during 
the 1720s and numerous historians point to their significance in 
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formulating and channeling American opposition ideology. Letter 
number 45, entitled, "Of the Equality and Inequality of Men" printed in 
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1721, is noteworthy. In one of the most revolutionary statements of 
the eighteenth century, Cato wrote in his opening line that, "men are 
naturally equal, and none ever rose above the rest but by force or 
Consent: No man was ever born above all the rest, nor below them all." 
"Nature," he asserted, "is a kind and benevolent Parent; she 
constitutes no particular favorites with Endowments and Privileges 
above the rest. ..." Furthermore: 
91 
All the Arts and Endowments of Men to acquire 
Pre-eminence and Advantages over one another, are so many 
Proofs and Confessions that they have not such Pre-eminence 
and Advantages from Nature; and all their Pomp, Titles, and 
Wealth, are Means and Devices to make the World think that 
they possess them are superior in Merit to those that want 
them. But it is not much to the Glory of the upper Part of 
Mankind, that their boasted and superior Merit is often the 
Work of Heralds, Artificers, and Money; and that many 
derive their whole Stock of Fame from Ancestors, who lived 
an Age or many Ages ago. There is nothing moral in Blood, 
or in Title, or in Place: Actions only, and the Causes that 
produce them, are moral. He therefore is best that does 
best. Noble Blood prevents neither Folly, nor Lunacy, nor 
Crimes: but frequently begets or promotes them: And 
Noblemen, who act infamously, derive no Honour from 
virtuous Ancestors, whom they dishonour. A Man who does 
base Things, is not noble; nor great, if he do little 
Things: A sober Villager is a better Man than a debauched 
Lord; an honest Mechanick than a Knavish Courtier. 
By the 1740s Americans began articulating similar arguments. 
Titles and preferments, though occasionally beneficial in rewarding 
someone for good deeds or services or simply the mark of good 
upstanding charcter, seemed on balance to be unfairly doled out within 
the Empire and had become inflated with time. In 1747, William 
Douglass observed that, "Hereditary nobility and other great officers 
where any considerable Trust attends, are great Inticements to good 
actions in Progenitors, who are ambitious and entailing Honors upon 
their own Memory or Posterity." However, Douglass added, "in Nature 
[titles] seem absurd, as if wisdom were hereditary."''^ 
Political writers warned in the 1750s, just as had Puritan 
theologians in the 1600s, that Americans should not be taken in by the 
grandeur and vanity of preferments. Just because an aristocrat might 
have a high-sounding title prefixed or suffixed to his name, did not 
necessarily imply he was a man of high moral fiber. A writer 
complained to the Virginia Gazette in 1751 that, "I have observed that 
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the majority of those that claim "the "term gentleman. . .have 
abandoned themselves to such trifling or vicious Practices, and glory 
in them as their Peculiar Badge and Characteristic."''"^ In a 1753 New 
York newspaper essay entitled, "The Vanity of Birth and Titles; with 
the Absurdity of Claiming Respect without Merit," the opposition 
spokesman, William Livingston, cautioned his readers that, "an 
indiscriminate respect for Men in conspicuous Stations, barely on 
account of their extraneous Advantages, tho' they abuse and pervert 
them, degenerates into a Vice, and is introductive of the most 
pernicious Mischiefs." "Real Dignity and worth," he continued, "are 
personal and Intrinsic. They cannot be derived from Princes, nor 
entailed on Titles.""^ 
Similar attitudes filtered into the Revolutionary period, 
particularly when republican-minded writers began emphasizing frugality 
and simplistic virtue over refinements and vanity which had come to 
represent a foppish, corrupt, court-controlled English government. In 
1769, Purdie and Dixon's Virginia Gazette, noted that, "The phrase 
[gentleman] can have its origin no where but in human vanity and 
18 
nothing but pride can support it." In 1768 one of Governor Bernard's 
old nemeses, the Boston radical, James Otis, Jr., expressed this new 
view towards English institutions when he said that, "tis notoriously 
known there are no set of people. . .more venal, more corrupt and 
19 
debauched in their principles," than the House of Lords. "Rank at 
present," an anonomyous Philadelphian remarked in early 1776, "is 
derived more from qualification than property; a sound moral character, 
amiable manners and firmness in principle constitute the first class, 
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and will continue to do so 'till the origin of families be forgotten 
and the proud follies of the old world over-run the simplicity of the 
,i20 
new. 
Old traditions died hard, however, and for many Americans 
discarding the vestiges of their venerated English past was a difficult 
task at best. In most aspects of colonial culture the Americans felt 
themselves inferior to their British counterparts. To members of the 
upper classes who prided themselves on political stability in the face 
of frontier conditions and who sought to mimic the English style, to 
Anglicize themselves, to seek legitimacy in the face of a growing 
republican population, to be thought of as inferior in British circles 
21 
or chastised for their aspirations, was especially galling. 
As the venerable colonial historian, Michael Kammen, has noted, 
"The sources of legitimacy in political society may be hereditary, 
aristocratic, democratic, elective, or a combination thereof." 
Significantly, he notes, legitimacy in the English colonies "inhered 
increasingly in democratic and elective sources, rather than in 
hereditary and titled origins." "Nevertheless," he argues, "the 
colonists recognized this reality with great reluctance because it 
22 
signalled a serious departure from traditional European standards." 
Thus, the remedy for the flaw in the second branch of the American 
governments puzzled some American political theorists in light of the 
pervasive republican ideology. Titles, dignities, and hereditary 
preferments provided much-needed independence, but at the same time 
23 
smacked of English vanity. William Drayton, writing from South 
Carolina in 1774, believed he had found a solution. He declared that 
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"we do not yet desire dignities, Lordships and Dukedoms." However, he 
added, "a second branch of the legislature, permanent and not subject 
to removal by the Crown or People is an essential part of the 
Constitution." As a compromise Drayton suggested "that this branch 
shall be formed out of American families; as men so interested will be 
more zealous for the interests of America, than strangers destitute of 
property and natural alliance in the colonies," a direct reference to 
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the presence of placemen then occupying council positions. 
American leaders continued to grapple with this aspect of their 
respective governments well after the Revolution had run its course. 
Eventually, after several years of experimentation, an elective upper 
house, the Senate, was installed in the federal and state governments 
as the ultimate solution. An elective upper chamber composed of the 
ablest men in society, seemed to solve the dilemma of an aristocratic 
branch in a republican form of government and provided the balance 
25 
vital to the newly formed American governments. More immediately, 
what, then, became of the attempts such as those by Governor Bernard 
and others to create an artificial hereditary aristocracy in colonial 
America? 
Ill 
Based upon their readings of classical and English histories the 
American leaders after 1763 had become increasing wary of any form of 
external interference into their political affairs by the British. As 
recent historians have accurately noted, after greater imperial control 
of the colonies had become policy after 1763, many of the leading 
95 
Americans saw British actions, no matter how trifling, as a prelude to 
more sinister activity in the future. Any form of feudalistic practice 
introduced by Britain into the colonies—a titled nobility surely 
qualified—suspiciously resembled an attempt further to control the 
lives of Americans, paving the way to, at best their reduction to 
political serfdom, at worst, feudal slavery, with homage paid in the 
form of burdensome taxation.^ 
To Americans recently groomed in the libertarian rhetoric of the 
English Whig opposition and from their study of ancient British 
history, England had been an orderly representative democracy under the 
Saxon kings, but with the Norman conquest, a nobility had entrenched 
itself, and corruption and heavy taxes to support its affluent 
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positions soon followed in its wake. Could not the same happen in 
America? As far back as 1740, the Maryland Assembly in a debate with 
the governor and the Council over the creation of a Maryland version of 
the English peerage, cautioned that although, "We incline to believe 
that the Plantation would as soon obtain Aristocracies. . .by filling 
Upper Houses with Lords Temporal. . . .Yet any Proposition in favour of 
this. . .might not meet with a very easy Digestion; because the 
Revenues necessary to support their Dignity must be raised out of the 
28 
immediate Labour of the People in the Colonies." 
Moreover, if Americans, the Assembly cautioned, did not remain on 
guard, the enormity of prerogative power could easily overwhelm them. 
"Let such a distinct Power, be once created," they charged: 
more especially if it be under a Governor's direction, 
as it is in Maryland; and it will gradually and 
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imperceptibly, or perhaps at one Stroke, if the 
Representatives or trustees for the People should at any 
Time drop asleep. . .changes or dissolutions prove 
faithless, create to itself for that is one principal End 
of its Creation, a distinct Interest, as in fees, 
Perquisites, Rents and Revenues. 
The only place these revenues could possibly be obtained they 
concluded, was "out of the Labour of the People." The establishment of 
such an interest, they agreed, would "not only seem useless, but 
29 
visibly dangerous." 
Herein rested the key problem with external attempts to 
manufacture an American nobility. The American Revolutionary leaders 
were indeed radicals, but as Bernard Bailyn and R.R. Palmer have noted, 
they were eighteenth century radicals. They did not overly concern 
themselves with a basic inequality in society or Britain's recasting of 
the social order. It was unrestrained power that an attempt like 
Governor Bernard's, if successful, would come to represent. If the 
v 
prerogative power was allowed to succeed vis-a-vis the restructuring of 
30 
American political institutions, just where would it finally stop? To 
most Americans the answer appeared plainly—political power left 
unrestrained and unharnessed, would shortly bound the American 
colonists in the yoke of slavery. Plans for a nobility represented 
just one attempt among many, of an evil, designing Parliament's desire 
to enslave the Americans. The editor of the Virginia Gazette expressed 
the ideas of many when he wrote in the fall of 1775 that Americans who 
read of these English proposals, "will then find how eagerly 
[Parliament] wishes to form distinctions amongst us" that would only 
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serve, he noted, "to create a few more tools of oppression." 
Rumors of the creation of an American bishop and an Anglican 
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episcopacy in the colonies in the late 1760s, ostensibly hatched by 
Parliament to pacify and control American religious stirrings, were 
viewed in the same vein as attempts to create an American nobility. 
Anne Hulton, a Boston loyalist, noted that: 
The Credulity of the Common People here is imposed on 
by a number of Lies raised to irritate and inflame them. 
They believe that the [Customs] Commissioners have an 
unlimited power given to tax even their Lands and that its 
in order to raise a revenue for supporting a number of 
bishops that are coming over.32 
A 1768 cartoon depicted the arrival of a mitre-crowned bishop 
aboard a British ship being met by banner-waving American patriots 
readying themselves to throw the clergyman overboard. The inscription 
on the banner read, "no lords, spiritual or temporal," and other 
captions agreed with Miss Hulton's observations that bishops equalled 
increased taxation. The eminent American congregationalist, Jonathan 
Mayhew, writing to the Archbishop of Canterbury, steadfastly maintained 
that, "Bishops," could very easily be used in "establishing a tyranny 
over the bodies and souls of men." Moreover, "the stamping and 
episcopizing [of] our colonies. . .were only different branches of the 
33 
same power." 
The "American Whig" wrote in a 1768 issue of the New York Gazette 
that an American bishop would "sow the seeds of universal discord; and 
besides the deprivation of our civil liberties, lend his helping hand 
to involve us in ecclesiastical bondage into the bargain. Is this a 
time to think of episcopal palaces," he wondered, "of pontifical 
revenues, of spiritual courts, and all the pomp, grandeur, luxury and 
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regalia of an American Lambeth?" "The Bishop," he added, would be a 
"splendid, opulent, court-favored, law-dignified, superb, magnificent, 
powerful prelate. . ." but one of "the worst commodities that can 
possibly be imported into a new country, and must inevitably prove 
Q/ 
absolute desolation and ruin to this." 
Though their fears later proved unfounded—the British ministry 
never seriously considered sending bishops to America—John Adams 
35 summarized the deeper signficance of their premature concerns. 
Writing in 1815 he believed that, "The apprehension of Episcopacy 
contributed fifty years ago, as much as any other cause, to arouse the 
attention. . .of the common people, and urge them to close thinking on 
the constitutional authority over the colonies." "The objection," he 
held, "was not merely to the office of a bishop, though even that was 
dreaded, but to the authority of Parliament, on which it must be 
36 
founded." 
The same could be said of Adams's opinions on the introduction of 
an American nobility. The young Massachusetts lawyer, perhaps the most 
eloquent and articulate of the Revolutionary spokesmen, expressed and 
molded the opinions of many Americans. In his series of letters to the 
Boston Gazette published in 1773 and 1774 entitled "Novanglus," Adams 
informed his American readers, "that the ministry and their governors 
together had formed a design to enslave them and when once this was 
done," the country could only expect reduction to "lordships." After 
some of Governor Bernard's letters were published in 1774 on the topic 
of an independent hereditary aristocracy, Adams reminded his public 
that as early as 1764, Governor Bernard had "formed a design of this 
99 
sort." The future president believed as further indication of a grand 
conspiracy to subvert American liberties, one need only point to 
"Hutchinson and Oliver," (whose letters had been surreptitiously 
published in 1773) "notwithstanding all their disguises were in unison 
37 
with [Bernard] in the whole of his measures." 
Some thirty-odd years later, the retired statesman in a letter to 
Mercy Warren, reflected upon these attempts to oppress the American 
people. In the same letter he described his famous "Principles of 
Revolution," the sixth labelled the "Necessity of resisting the 
introduction of a Royal or Parliamentary nobility or aristocracy into 
38 
the country." Adams, as many of his countrymen had come to realize 
after a decade of attempted British interference in their lives, 
believed such measures as Bernard's and later Oliver's, "would 
annihilate all our privileges by charter, and establish the sovereign 
authority of Parliament in all our internal concerns." "I entered 
therefore," he wrote, "with zeal into an opposition to this scheme." 
Judged by their subsequent armed revolt in quest for independence from 
the yoke of British domination, most Americans shared Adams's 
sentiments and instead chose new, democratic methods over those 
European and tradition-worn ones, in determining which men would rule 
39 
their new nation. 
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- AFTERWORD -
No title of nobility shall be granted by the United 
States. 
United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 9 
Looking back from the twentieth century, the revered British 
socio-political institution of a titled nobility, the key fixture in 
the English system of mixed government, did not make the journey to the 
colonial settlements of the New World. As a result, instablity caused 
in part by dependency, factional opposition, and the lack of legitimacy 
felt by the colonial elites who had served in the American counterpart 
to the English House of Lords—the colonial councils—gradually shook 
the foundations of eighteenth century colonial politics. Partially 
correct, British and some American officials attributed this 
instability, to the lack of a bona fide mediating class residing 
between the governor on the one hand, the representative of the crown, 
and on the other, the people, represented by the colonial assemblies. 
Without the status, the legitimacy thought to be provided by titles of 
nobility, hereditary authority and the like, many believed that by the 
1760s and 1770s the perfect mixed governmental model had completely 
broken down in America, contributing significantly to the Revolutionary 
crisis. These notions, true or false as they may have been, generated 
frantic pleas from those closely connected with the colonial political 
situation for someone, whether in Britain or even America, if feasible, 
to perfect and balance an inchoate, imperfect and unbalanced system. 
Americans, recently inundated with republican principles and 
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ideology—an ideology that flew directly against titles of nobility, 
artificially contrived inequality, deference and the like—resisted 
these attempts. The Revolutionary crisis and subsequent overthrow of 
British rule and the institution of a democratic republican government 
in its place, laid these plans to rest. 
Many British officials remained convinced well after the 
Revolution that the loss of the American colonies could be directly 
attributed in Prime Minister William Pitt's words, to "the want of the 
more resemblance in their constitution^] with that of Great Britain."''' 
In the 1789 parliamentary debate over the new Canadian constitution, 
the powerful Lord Grenville proposed the creation of a titled 
aristocracy designed to give the Canadian upper house, "a greater 
degree of weight and consequence than was possessed by the councils in 
the old colonial government and to establish in the provinces a body of 
men having that motive of attachment to the existing form of government 
which arises from the possession of personal or hereditary 
2 
distinction." The subsequent Canada Act of 1791 did allow for a 
life-tenured, upper-house whose members were eligible for titles or 
ranks as the king saw fit. The provision, however, for a variety of 
3 
reasons, never went into effect in Canada. In America, during the 
nascent Federalist era, despite, ironically, John Adams's half-hearted 
campaign to secure high-sounding titles for certain members of the 
4 
government, all pretenses to nobility were outlawed. Instead, a 
natural aristocracy, embodied in the elective Senate emerged to fulfill 
the role of the upper house and to safeguard interests of the 
propertied element of American society.^ 
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To conclude, and in the words of one contemporary historian, "had 
a new variety of English aristocracy been established in America. . 
and had a truly English gentry been formed. . .then perhaps the 
Americans would today be British commonwealthmen."^ And furthermore, 
Section 9 of Article 1 of the United States Constitution, forbidding 
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Thought, pp. 176-82, for this curious, but ill-fated twist in 
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aristocracy in post-Revolutionary America. 
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